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Abstract
Differential privacy (DP) provides rigorous privacy guarantees on individual’s data while
also allowing for accurate statistics to be conducted on the overall, sensitive dataset. To design
a private system, first private algorithms must be designed that can quantify the privacy loss
of each outcome that is released. However, private algorithms that inject noise into the com-
putation are not sufficient to ensure individuals’ data is protected due to many noisy results
ultimately concentrating to the true, non-privatized result. Hence there have been several works
providing precise formulas for how the privacy loss accumulates over multiple interactions with
private algorithms. However, these formulas either provide very general bounds on the privacy
loss, at the cost of being overly pessimistic for certain types of private algorithms, or they can be
too narrow in scope to apply to general privacy systems. In this work, we unify existing privacy
loss composition bounds for special classes of differentially private (DP) algorithms along with
general DP composition bounds. In particular, we provide strong privacy loss bounds when
an analyst may select pure DP, bounded range (e.g. exponential mechanisms), or concentrated
DP mechanisms in any order. We also provide optimal privacy loss bounds that apply when
an analyst can select pure DP and bounded range mechanisms in a batch, i.e. non-adaptively.
Further, when an analyst selects mechanisms within each class adaptively, we show a differ-
ence in privacy loss between different, predetermined orderings of pure DP and bounded range
mechanisms. Lastly, we compare the composition bounds of Laplace and Gaussian mechanisms
based on histogram datasets.
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1 Introduction
Differential privacy (DP) provides a mathematical formalism to an intuitive notion of what it means
for a computation to be private — the computation should produce similar results with or without
any one individual’s data. With this formalism, we can quantify the privacy loss of a computation
that injects noise when evaluated on a sensitive dataset. This allows us to determine which DP
algorithms are more private than others, i.e. which has smaller privacy loss. Furthermore, if
multiple computations are done on the same dataset we can still quantify the privacy loss over the
entire interaction with the dataset, i.e. DP composes. As opposed to measuring utility empirically,
e.g. prediction accuracy of a classification task, privacy loss in DP requires analytical bounds
over worst case datasets and outcomes. Improvements to the privacy loss bounds show that a
given algorithm might actually be more private than originally proposed, with no changes to the
algorithm itself.
Hence, there have been many works in precisely bounding the overall privacy loss. There are
multiple composition bounds to use, including bounds that hold for any DP algorithms [10, 11, 15,
18], as well as improved composition bounds that only apply to specific types of DP algorithms
[1, 17, 4, 6, 7, 5]. In the design of a DP system, we would like to provide the best possible bounds
on the privacy loss that apply for combinations of general DP algorithms as well as specific types of
DP algorithms that enjoy much better composition bounds. One can simply use the most general
formulations to provide a loose bound on the overall privacy loss, but this neglects the improvements
that can be made, which allow for more queries or more accurate results.
Consider a privacy system for data analytics, supporting tasks such as counting queries and
exploratory analysis. These general tasks typically use the Laplace mechanism [10] or Gaussian
mechanism [9] to provide noisy counts, as well as exponential mechanisms [16], a general class of
DP algorithms that have been shown to achieve much improved composition bounds. In particular,
Dong et al. [5] showed that one can query nearly four times more exponential mechanisms for the
same overall privacy bound as what can be achieved with using the general, optimal DP composition
bounds [15]. This improvement is because Durfee and Rogers [7] defined a stronger condition
that exponential mechanisms satisfy, called bounded range (BR). In particular ε-BR implies ε-DP,
whereas ε-DP implies 2ε-BR. Further, the Gaussian mechanism does not satisfy (pure) ε-DP, but
rather a slight relaxation called concentrated DP (CDP) [8] or zero-mean concentrated DP (zCDP)
[4].
To see that combining DP and BR mechanisms can arise naturally, consider a privacy system
that allows for general top-k queries. One would typically use a two phase approach to ensure DP.
The first phase would use a series of exponential mechanisms to discover the domain of elements
in the top-k. Given the discovered set, the second phase goes back to the dataset to add noise
to the true counts of the discovered elements via the Laplace mechanism and then release the
noisy counts. In fact, most DP top-k algorithms use this two phase approach, see for example
Bhaskar et al. [3] and Durfee and Rogers [7]. One approach to bounding the privacy loss of such
an interaction would be to simply use the general DP composition bounds, but this ignores the
improved composition bounds that are possible via the BR analysis. Another approach would be
to analyze the composition bounds via BR, but this results in doubling the privacy parameter for
each Laplace mechanism, as was done in LinkedIn’s privacy system that handles top-k queries [19].
We then follow a line of research proposed in Dong et al. [5], studying the privacy loss bounds that
combine both general DP bounds and improved BR bounds.
We make several contributions in this work. First, we provide a bound on the overall privacy
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guarantee in a much more general setting than has been studied before. Specifically, we allow
bounds on the overall privacy loss when an analyst can select at each round of interaction a privacy
parameter from a set of preregistered privacy parameters E , without replacement, and then selects
a corresponding mechanism that can be selected as a function of previous outcomes. It seems more
natural for an analyst’s choice of mechanism to also be dependent on a privacy parameter, since that
determines the level of accuracy of the mechanism. Previous composition bounds required knowing
the ordering of the privacy parameters in advance, so could not be selected as an analyst interacts
with a private system, with the exception of the privacy odometer bounds from Rogers et al. [20]
which does not require a preregistered set of privacy parameters but defines a different privacy
guarantee than traditional DP. Although loose, we provide bounds to the overall privacy loss in
this more general setting which are able to beat optimal bounds for general pure-DP mechanisms
by incorporating improved bounds for BR and concentrated DP mechanisms. These results allow
for much more freedom in how the analyst interacts with a privacy system; see Section 3.
Our next contribution is that we provide the optimal privacy loss bound when k −m of the k
ε-DP mechanisms are ε-BR and are non-adaptively selected in the homogenous privacy parameter
setting, i.e. all privacy parameters are ε. With these bounds, we can interpolate between the two
extremes of only composing ε-DP mechanisms [15, 18] and composing only ε-BR mechanisms [5].
Note that these bounds allow for worst case orderings of ε-DP and ε-BR mechanisms, as long as
the ordering is selected in advance.
We then demonstrate that ordering between ε-BR and ε-DP mechanisms matters when the
mechanisms are allowed to be adaptively selected. Hence the privacy loss can differ between an
analyst adaptively selecting exponential mechanisms after using Laplace mechanisms and an analyst
that alternates between exponential mechanisms and Laplace mechanisms (as one would do with a
top-k DP system).
One omission from our consideration of the optimal privacy parameters of exponential mecha-
nisms and general pure DP mechanisms is the Gaussian mechanism, which adds Gaussian noise to
return noisy counts. We address the Gaussian mechanism in Section 6, which gives a comparison
of the overall DP parameters when Laplace or Gaussian noise is added to histograms. We see that
for reasonable parameter settings, they give roughly the same privacy loss, but when the number of
privatized results grow, Gaussian noise gives smaller privacy loss. Based on this, we then propose
Gaussian based variants of mechanisms presented in LinkedIn’s recently deployed privacy system
[19]. We see the inclusion of the Gaussian mechanism to the optimal DP composition bounds with
pure DP and BR as a fruitful direction for future work.
2 Preliminaries
We begin by defining differential privacy, which considers two neighboring datasets x, x′ from some
data universe X , i.e. x is the same as x′ except one user’s data has been removed or added,
sometimes denoted as x ∼ x′. Note that DP is parameterized by the privacy loss parameter ε > 0
and a small probability of privacy failure δ ∈ [0, 1].
Definition 2.1 (Dwork et al. [10]). A randomized algorithm M : X → Y that maps input set X
to some arbitrary outcome set Y is (ε, δ)-differentially private (DP) if for any neighboring datasets
x, x′ and outcome sets S ⊆ Y,
Pr [M(x) ∈ S] ≤ eε Pr [M(x′) ∈ S]+ δ.
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When δ = 0, we typically say that M is ε-DP or pure DP.
One of the most useful properties of DP is that it composes, meaning that if one were to
repeatedly use different DP algorithms, which can be adaptively selected at each round, then the
result will be DP, although with a slightly worse privacy loss parameter. A class of mechanisms
that enjoys improved composition bounds are bounded range (BR) mechanisms, which is similar
to pure DP [7, 5]. Roughly, composing ε-BR mechanisms in a batch (i.e. non-adaptively) is nearly
the same, in terms of the accumulated privacy loss, as composing ε/2-DP mechanisms.
Definition 2.2 (Durfee and Rogers [7]). A randomized algorithm M : X → Y that maps input set
X to some arbitrary outcome set Y is ε-bounded range (BR) if for any neighboring datasets x, x′
and outcomes y1, y2 ∈ Y,
Pr [M(x) = y1]
Pr [M(x′) = y1]
≤ eε Pr [M(x) = y2]
Pr [M(x′) = y2]
We then have the following connection between pure DP and BR.
Lemma 2.1 (Durfee and Rogers [7]). If M is ε-DP then it is 2ε-BR. Alternatively, if M is ε-BR
then M is ε-DP. Furthermore, if M is ε-BR then for each pair of neighbors x, x′, there exists a
t := t(x, x′) ∈ [0, ε] such that
t− ε ≤ ln
(
Pr [M(x) = y]
Pr [M(x′) = y]
)
≤ t.
It turns out that one of the canonical mechanisms in DP, the exponential mechanism [16], with
parameter ε is ε-BR. Thus, when working with the exponential mechanism, one should consider
composition for BR mechanisms, rather than DP mechanisms. We then define the exponential
mechanism, which provides a general way to construct DP mechanisms. It takes a quality score
u : X ×Y → R and samples an outcome y based on the quality score u(x, y) computed on the input
data. We will also need to define the range of the quality score
∆˜u := sup
x∼x′
{
max
y∈Y
{u(x, y)− u(x′, y)} − min
y′∈Y
{u(x, y′)− u(x′, y′)}
}
.
The original definition is due to McSherry and Talwar [16], but then it was recently modified
with a slight refinement, based on the range of the quality score rather than the global sensitivity,
in Dong et al. [5].
Definition 2.3 (Exponential Mechanism [16, 5]). For a given quality score u : X × Y → R the
exponential mechanism Mu : X → Y with input x ∈ X returns y ∈ Y with probability proportional
to
exp
(
εu(x, y)
∆˜u
)
.
McSherry and Talwar [16] showed that Mu is ε-DP and Durfee and Rogers [7] showed that it
satisfies the stronger condition of ε-BR. In order to prove the optimal composition bounds for DP
or BR mechanisms, it is sufficient to consider a simpler mechanism, based on randomized response
[21]. This mechanism takes a single bit and returns a bit, subject to DP or BR. We provide the
generalized version of randomized response below, which is from Dong et al. [5].
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Definition 2.4 (Generalized Random Response). For any ε ≥ 0 and t ∈ [0, ε], let RRε,t : {0, 1} →
{0, 1} be a randomized mechanism in terms of probabilities qε,t and pε,t such that
RRε,t(0) = 0 w.p.
1− et−ε
1− e−ε =: qε,t and RRε,t(0) = 1 w.p.
et−ε − e−ε
1− e−ε =: 1− qε,t
RRε,t(1) = 0 w.p.
e−t − e−ε
1− e−ε =: pε,t and RRε,t(1) = 1 w.p.
1− e−t
1− e−ε =: 1− pε,t.
Note that RR2ε,ε(·) is the standard randomized response mechanism from DP and is ε-DP. When
considering the worst case optimal composition bounds of k adaptively or nonadaptively chosen
ε-DP mechanisms, we need only consider the overall privacy loss of k repeated instances of RR2ε,ε(·)
[15]. For obtaining the worst case optimal composition bound of ε-BR mechanisms, it gets more
complicated. The main difficulty is in how each ti ∈ [0, ε] is selected at each round i ∈ [k]. If all
the ti’s are preselected, corresponding to non-adaptively selecting ε-BR mechanisms in advance,
then Dong et al. [5] provide an efficiently computable formula for the optimal composition bound.
However, if each ti can be selected as a function of previous outcomes, i.e. the adaptive setting,
then they provide a recursive formula for computing the optimal bound on the privacy loss, which
is conjectured to be hard to compute, even in the homogenous privacy parameter setting.
We will write MBR(ε) to denote the class of all ε-BR mechanisms, and similarly MDP(ε) will
denote the class of all ε-DP mechanisms. As discussed earlier, we will need to differentiate our
bounds when the mechanisms can be adaptively selected at each round or not. We then write
M1 × M2 = {(M1(·),M2(·)) : M1 ∈ M1,M2 ∈ M2} as the non-adaptively selected class of
mechanisms from M1 and M2. Alternatively, we will write (M1,M2) = {M1(·),M2(·,M1(·)) :
M1 ∈ M1,M2 ∈ M2} to denote the class of mechanisms that can be adaptively selected at each
round, based on outcomes of previously selected mechanisms.
Since DP has two privacy parameters, we will typically fix εg and write the best possible δ as
a function of εg. Hence, we will use the following definition for the optimal privacy parameter as a
function of εg, which was also used in [5].
Definition 2.5 (Optimal Privacy Parameters). Given a mechanism M : X → Y and any εg ∈ R,
we define the optimal δ to be
δOPT(M ; εg) := inf
{
δ ≥ 0 : M is (εg, δ)-DP
}
.
Further, if M is a class of mechanisms M : X → Y, then for any εg ∈ R, we define
δOPT(M; εg) := sup
M∈M
δOPT(M ; εg).
We have the following formula for the optimal composition bound for homogenous, adaptively
selected pure DP mechanisms.
Theorem 1 (Optimal Homogeneous DP Composition [15]). For every ε > 0 and εg ≥ 0, we have
the following where εi = ε for all i ∈ [k]
δOPT((MDP(ε1), · · · ,MDP(εk)); εg) = 1
(1 + eε)k
k∑
`=
⌈
εg+kε
2ε
⌉
(
k
`
)(
e`ε − eεg+(k−`)ε
)
.
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We have the following result from Theorem 3 in Dong et al. [5], which results in improved DP
composition bounds when compared with the optimal DP composition bounds for general ε-DP
mechanisms, but only applies in the non-adaptive setting.
Theorem 2 (Optimal Homogeneous Non-adaptive BR Composition [5]). Consider the case where
over k rounds, each mechanism is a non-adaptively selected ε-BR mechanism. We set t∗` =
εg+(`+1)ε
k+1
where if t∗` /∈ [0, ε], then we round it to the closest point in [0, ε]. We then have the following, where
we write [y]+ = max{0, y}, and write εi = ε for i ∈ [k]
δOPT(MBR(ε1)× · · · ×MBR(εk); εg) = max
`∈{0,··· ,k}
k∑
i=0
(
k
i
)
(e−t∗` − e−ε)k−i(1− e−t∗` )i
(1− e−ε)k
[
ekt
∗
`−iε − eεg
]
+
.
We will also use concentrated differential privacy (CDP) [8] as a privacy definition, which is
typically used to analyze mechanisms that add Gaussian noise to statistics. Note that there are
other variants related to CDP, including zero-mean CDP (zCDP) [4] and Re´nyi DP (RDP) [17].
We first define the privacy loss random variable in terms of two random variables Y and Z over
the same support
LY ||Z := ln
(
Pr[Y = y]
Pr[Z = y]
)
where y ∼ Y.
Definition 2.6 (Concentrated Differential Privacy). A randomized algorithm M is (µ, τ)-CDP
if for all neighboring inputs x, x′, we have E[LM(x)||M(x′)] ≤ µ and for any λ ∈ R we have
E
[
exp
(
λ
(
LM(x)||M(x′) − E[LM(x)||M(x′)]
))]≤eλ2·τ2/2.
Note that if a statistic f : X → R can change by at most ∆f on neighboring datasets, i.e. the
sensitivity of f , then M(x) = N
(
f(x),∆2fσ
2
)
satisfies ( 1
2σ2
, 1σ )-CDP [8].
We also provide the definition of zero-mean CDP (zCDP) from Bun and Steinke [4], which is
useful for us in a later section due to its approximate version. It is based on the Re´nyi divergence
of order α > 1 between two distributions P and Q over the same domain, denoted as Dα(P ||Q)
where
Dα(P ||Q) := 1
α− 1 lnEz∼P
[(
P (z)
Q(z)
)α−1]
.
Definition 2.7 (Zero-mean Concentrated Differential Privacy). A randomized algorithm M : X →
Y is δ-approximately (ξ, ρ)-zCDP if for any neighbors x, x′ ∈ X , there exists events E and E′, such
that Pr[E],Pr[E′] ≥ 1 − δ and for every α > 1 we have the following bound in terms of the Re´nyi
divergence Dα(·||·) of order α
Dα(M(x)|E ||M(x′)|E′) ≤ αρ+ ξ and Dα(M(x′)|E′ ||M(x)|E) ≤ αρ+ ξ.
where M(x)|E is the distribution of M(x) conditioned on event E and similarly for M(x′)|E′, If
δ = 0, then we say M is (ξ, ρ)-zCDP and if ξ = 0 we write ρ-zCDP.
We then have the following connection between CDP and zCDP.
Lemma 2.2 (Bun and Steinke [4]). If M is (µ, τ)-CDP, then M is also (µ− τ2/2, τ2/2)-zCDP.
Note that we have the following connection between zCDP and DP.
Lemma 2.3 (Bun and Steinke [4]). If M is ρ-zCDP then M is also (ρ + 2
√
ρ ln(1/δ), δ)-DP for
any δ > 0.
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3 Set-wise Adaptive Composition
We now present a general way to interact with a privacy system that allows the analyst lots of
freedom in selecting different private mechanisms. We unify the variants of DP (BR, DP, CDP)
by analyzing with CDP, since it is the weakest of the three. We allow the analyst to select CDP
parameters from a set E := {(µi, τi) : i ∈ [k]} at each round, but the order need not be predeter-
mined. The analyst selects CDP parameters from E without replacement so that after k rounds
each parameter has been used. This extra freedom to the analyst was not considered in previous
composition bounds and stops short of the complete freedom of adaptive parameter selection in
privacy odometers [20]. Allowing an analyst to adaptively select the order of parameters arises
naturally in practice. Consider a setting where an analyst does heavy hitter selection (with BR
mechanisms) and then decides whether they want counts as well with Laplace noise (DP), with
Gaussian noise (CDP) to do some post processing (see later section that describes such a post
processing mechanism), or simply a new heavy hitter query.
We now detail the experiment between the analyst and the private mechanisms. We start with
the analyst selecting CDP parameters (µ1, τ1) and then a CDP mechanism with those parameters,
while also updating E ← E \ {(µ1, τ1)}. Similar to other works on privacy loss composition, the
analyst may then select neighboring datasets x
(0)
1 , x
(1)
1 . Once the analyst sees the outcome from the
selected mechanism evaluated on the (unknown) b ∈ {0, 1} dataset, the analyst gets to adaptively
select CDP parameters from the remaining set E , a corresponding mechanism, and neighboring
datasets x
(0)
2 , x
(1)
2 . We then delete the selected privacy parameters and continue. The interaction
proceeds until E = ∅. The information that is hidden from the analyst is the bit b ∈ {0, 1} that
determines which of the neighboring datasets is used at each round.
We refer to this protocol between the analyst and the privacy system as the E-set-wise adaptive
composition experiment b. As in Dwork et al. [11], we refer to V (b) as the view of the analyst in
the E-set-wise adaptive composition experiment b. Hence, we want to be able to show that the two
experiments with b and 1− b are similar.1
Definition 3.1. We say that E is (εg, δ)-differentially private under set-wise adaptive composition
if for any outcome set S for the E-set-wise adaptive composition experiment b, we have Pr[V (b) ∈
S] ≤ eεg Pr[V (1−b) ∈ S] + δ.
In order to provide a privacy bound, we start with a general result that follows from Howard
et al. [14], but we include a proof in Appendix A for completeness.
Lemma 3.1. Let (Ω,F ,Pr) be a probability triple where ∅ := F0 ⊆ F1,⊆ · · · ⊆ F be an increasing
sequence of σ-algebras. Let Xi be a real-valued Fi-measurable random variable and X0 = 0. Assume
that there exists random variables Bi that are Fi−1 measurable for i ≥ 1 and B0 = 0 such that∑k
i=0B
2
i ≤ b2 a.s. for some constant b. If for all λ > 0, we have E[eλXi | Fi−1] ≤ eλ
2B2i /2 a.s. ∀i,
then we have for all β > 0
Pr
[
k∑
i=1
Xi ≥ β
]
≤ e
−β2
2b2 .
1As presented, we do not allow for the analyst to randomize over different choices of mechanisms at each round
in the experiment. Hence, the analyst deterministically selects the next mechanism based on the previous outcomes.
However, the differential privacy guarantees for the experiment would not change if we allow the analyst to randomize
over choices of mechanisms at each round, as was shown in Lemma 4.3 in [5]
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Many concentration bounds rely on a subgaussian bound. This particular result allows us to
get a subgaussian bound on the sum of mean zero terms when we know a bound on the sum of
subgaussian parameters for each term and each individual subgaussian parameter need not be a
fixed constant. This allows the analyst to adaptively select different classes of mechanisms at each
round, where the subgaussian parameter changes based on the class that is selected.
We then define the privacy loss random variable, which we will bound with high probability
to get a bound on the overall privacy loss. At each round i, the analyst has all the necessary
information from the previous outcomes to decide on which neighboring datasets to use, which
class of mechanism to select, which of the remaining privacy parameters to choose, and which
specific mechanism Mi to pick. The previous outcomes and choices of the analyst up to round i are
random variables from the sigma algebra Fi−1. The selected randomized mechanism Mi takes the
input to some outcome set Yi and for each yi ∈ Yi we define the following for neighboring datasets
x, x′
Li(yi) := ln
(
Pr[Mi(x) = yi | Fi−1]
Pr[Mi(x′) = yi | Fi−1]
)
Li := Li(Yi) where Yi ∼Mi(x) | Fi−1.
We then consider the full privacy loss over the entire E-set-wise adaptive composition experiment,∑k
i=1 Li. Similar to Dwork et al. [11], we aim to bound the accumulated privacy loss with high
probability, i.e. Pr[
∑k
i=1 Li ≥ εg] ≤ δ, so that the E-set-wise adaptive composition experiment is
(εg, δ)-DP.
We then want to use Lemma 3.1, so we define the following random variables
Xi = Li − E[Li | Fi−1]. (1)
Next, we need bounds on E[Li | Fi−1] and on the subgaussian parameter for each Xi.
Lemma 3.2. For Xi given in (1), if the analyst selects an ε-DP mechanism Mi given Fi−1, then
for all λ ∈ R we have,
E[exp(λXi) | Fi−1] ≤ eλ2ε2/2 & E[Li | Fi−1] ≤ ε
(
eε − 1
eε + 1
)
.
If the analyst selects an α-BR mechanism Mi given Fi−1 then for all λ ∈ R we have
E[exp(λXi) | Fi−1] ≤ eλ2α2/8 & E[Li | Fi−1] ≤ α
eα − 1 − 1− ln
(
α
eα − 1
)
.
If the analyst selects a (µ, τ)-CDP mechanism Mi given Fi−1, then for all λ ∈ R, we have,
E[exp(λXi) | Fi−1] ≤ eλ2τ2/2 & E[Li | Fi−1] ≤ µ.
Proof. The statement about the CDP mechanism is simply due to the definition of (µ, τ)-CDP [8].
The expectations of the privacy losses for ε-DP and α-BR are from [15] and [5], respectively. From
Hoeffding [13], we know that for bounded random variables Xi ∈ [a, b] that X is subgaussian with
parameter (b− a)2/4. Hence, for ε-DP, we have b− a ≤ 2ε and for α-BR, we have b− a ≤ α.
Note that the advanced composition bound from [11] uses Azuma’s inequality for a concentration
bound on the privacy loss and [7] uses the more general Azuma-Hoeffding bound. Here, we use
Lemma 3.1 to get a bound on the privacy loss in a more general setting.
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Lemma 3.3. Let E = {(µi, τi) : i ∈ [k]}}. The set E is (εg, δ)-differentially private under set-wise
adaptive composition for any δ > 0, where
εg =
∑
i∈[k]
µi +
√
2
∑
i∈[k]
τ2i ln(1/δ).
Consider the setting where the analyst is allowed to select mDP pure-DP mechanisms, mBR BR
mechanisms, and mCDP concentrated DP mechanisms [8]. Furthermore, there are preregistered
privacy parameters EDP = {εi > 0 : i ∈ [mDP]} for pure DP mechanisms, EBR = {αi > 0 : i ∈ [mBR]}
for BR mechanisms, and ECDP = {(µi, τi) > (0, 0) : i ∈ [mCDP]} for CDP mechanisms. We allow the
analyst to adaptively select the class of mechanism at each round i adaptively and to also select
the privacy parameter from the corresponding class of mechanisms, without replacement. We then
apply Lemma 3.3 and Lemma 3.1 to get a bound on the privacy loss.
Corollary 3.1. Let E = {(ε, j) : ε ∈ Ej , j ∈ {DP, BR, CDP}}. The set E is (εg, δ)-differentially
private under set-wise adaptive composition for any δ > 0, where
εg =
∑
ε∈EDP
ε
(
eε − 1
eε + 1
)
+
∑
α∈EBR
(
α
eα − 1 − 1− ln
(
α
eα − 1
))
+
∑
µ:(µ,τ)∈ECDP
µ
+
√√√√√2
∑
ε∈EDP
ε2 +
1
4
∑
α∈EBR
α2 +
∑
τ :(µ,τ)∈ECDP
τ2
 ln(1/δ).
Note that when mDP = k , we get the traditional advanced composition bound from Dwork et al.
[11] with refinement from Kairouz et al. [15] and when mBR = k, we get the bound for composing
ε-BR mechanisms from Corollary 3.1 in Dong et al. [5]. In Figure 1, we present the family of
curves from Corollary 3.1 for different values of m = mDP, i.e. the number of ε-DP mechanisms,
k − m = mBR while fixing mCDP = 0, and compare it with the optimal DP composition bound
from Theorem 1. Note that applying the optimal DP bound is almost the same as using the given
formula when half are BR mechanisms and the remaining half are DP.
We can also do a similar analysis when all the mechanisms are zCDP (Definition 2.7), rather
than CDP, which will be useful when we use the approximate (δ > 0) version of zCDP in Section 6.
We modify the above experiment by using the set EzCDP = {(ξi, ρi) : i ∈ [k]}, to denote the zCDP
parameters that the analyst can select from at each round and then, with the selected parameters,
can choose a zCDP mechanism (as opposed to CDP as above). We have the following result which
again uses Lemma 3.1.
Lemma 3.4. Let EzCDP = {(ξi, ρi) : i ∈ [k]}}. The set EzCDP is (εg, δ)-differentially private under
set-wise adaptive composition, where zCDP mechanisms are selected at each round, for any δ > 0,
where
εg =
∑
i∈[k]
(ξi + ρi) + 2
√∑
i∈[k]
ρi ln(1/δ).
Proof. Note that the result here is analogous to Lemma 3.3 except we do not subtract off the mean
of the privacy loss to form Xi, yet we use the same filtration {Fi}. Consider the privacy loss Li
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Figure 1: We plot the bounds on εg from Corollary 3.1 for k many ε-DP mechanisms, of which
k −m are ε-BR. We also give the comparison to the optimal DP bound from Kairouz et al. [15].
Note that these bounds apply even when mechanisms can be adaptively selected at each round.
at each round i. We use Lemma 3.1 with Xi = Li − ξi − ρi and B2i = 2ρi. From the definition of
zCDP we have the following for any λ = α− 1 > 0,
E[exp (λ(Li − ξi − ρi)) | Fi−1] ≤ exp
(
λ2ρi
)
=⇒ E
[
exp
(
λ
k∑
i=1
(Li − ξi − ρi)− λ2
k∑
i=1
ρi
)]
≤ 1.
Recall that at each round i ∈ [k] the index of the parameters is a random variable, based on the
outcomes of previous results, but the resulting sum of parameters is predetermined. Hence, we
have
E
[
exp
(
λ
k∑
i=1
(Li − ξi − ρi)
)]
≤ exp
(
λ2
k∑
i=1
ρi
)
.
The rest of the analysis is identical to the proof of Lemma 3.5 from Bun and Steinke [4], which
gives the conversion of zCDP to approximate DP.
Recall that with Lemma 2.2, we can convert CDP parameters into zCDP parameters. Hence,
Corollary 3.1 can also be derived from Lemma 3.4 and Lemma 3.2.
4 Optimal Non-adaptive Composition Bounds
In this section we will present optimal bounds on the privacy loss when we combine both ε-BR
and ε-DP mechanisms and the BR mechanisms are all preselected, prior to any interaction. Note
that our analysis does allow for an analyst to select any order of ε-BR and ε-DP mechanisms in
advance, and the ε-DP mechanisms can be adaptively selected, but the ε-BR mechanisms cannot.
We now want to generalize Theorem 2 when m of the k mechanisms can be ε-DP, rather than
all being ε-BR. We will proceed in a similar way to the analysis in Section 5 of Dong et al. [5]. We
start with the following result that allows for heterogeneous εi at each i ∈ [k].
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Lemma 4.1 (Lemma 3.1 in Dong et al. [5]). Recall from Definition 2.4 we have pεi,ti , qεi,ti. We
then have
δOPT(MBR(ε1)× · · · ×MBR(εk); εg)
= sup
t∈∏i∈[k][0,εi]
∑
S⊆{1,...,k}
[∏
i/∈S
qεi,ti
∏
i∈S
(1− qεi,ti)− eεg
∏
i/∈S
pεi,ti
∏
i∈S
(1− pεi,ti)
]
+
.
We then define the elements that we take the sup over for general (t1, · · · , tk) and corresponding
privacy parameters (ε1, · · · , εk)
δ((t1, ε1)×· · ·×(tk, εk); εg) :=
∑
S⊆{1,...,k}
[∏
i/∈S
qεi,ti
∏
i∈S
(1− qεi,ti)− eεg
∏
i/∈S
pεi,ti
∏
i∈S
(1− pεi,ti)
]
+
. (2)
We then have the following result that shows that the ordering of mechanisms does not modify
the value of δOPT.
Lemma 4.2. Let pi : [k]→ [k] be a permutation on the indices [k], we then have
δ((t1, ε1)× · · · × (tk, εk); εg) = δ((tpi(1), εpi(1)), · · · , (tpi(k), εpi(k)); εg)
Proof. Note that the expression in (2) takes a summation over all possible subsets of indices. Hence,
if we permute the indices, the full summation has the same terms.
We will focus only on the homogeneous case, where all the privacy parameters are the same
and leave the heterogeneous case to future work. We have the immediate result from Lemma 4.2.
Lemma 4.3. Let ~M, ~M′ be two sequences of non-adaptively selected mechanisms where m are
MDP(ε) and k − m are from MBR(ε). We then have for any εg > 0 and ε > 0, δOPT( ~M; εg) =
δOPT( ~M′; εg).
Recall that the big difference between ε-BR and ε-DP mechanisms, is that ε-BR mechanisms use
the generalized randomized response RRε,t for a worst case t ∈ [0, ε] as opposed to ε-DP mechanisms
which use RR2ε,ε, so that t = ε. We then define the following function that fixes m of the ti
values to be ε which have corresponding εi = 2ε and corresponding sets S1 := [k −m] and S2 :=
12
{k −m+ 1, · · · , k}.
δ((t1, ε), · · · , (tk−m, ε), (ε, 2ε), · · · , (ε, 2ε); εg)
=
∑
S1⊆S1
∑
S2⊆S2
 ∏
i1∈S1\S1
qε,ti1
∏
i2∈S2\S2
q2ε,ε
∏
j1∈S1
(1− qε,tj1 )
∏
j2∈S2
(1− q2ε,ε)
−eεg
∏
i1∈S1\S1
pε,ti1
∏
i2∈S2\S2
p2ε,ε
∏
j1∈S1
(1− pε,tj1 )
∏
j2∈S2
(1− p2ε,ε)

+
=
∑
S1⊆S1
∑
S2⊆S2
qm−|S2|2ε,ε (1− q2ε,ε)|S2| ∏
i1∈S1\S1
qε,ti1
∏
j1∈S1
(1− qε,tj1 )
−eεgpm−|S2|2ε,ε (1− p2ε,ε)|S2|
∏
i1∈S1\S1
pε,ti1
∏
j1∈S1
(1− pε,tj1 )

+
Note that we have the simple connection with this function and the optimal δ,
δOPT
MBR(ε)× · · · ×MBR(ε)︸ ︷︷ ︸
k−m
×MDP(ε)× · · · ×MDP(ε)︸ ︷︷ ︸
m
; εg

= sup
t∈∏i∈{1,··· ,k−m}[0,ε] δ((t1, ε), · · · , (tk−m, ε), (ε, 2ε), · · · , (ε, 2ε))
We then use a key result from Dong et al. [5] that shows that despite BR mechanisms having
separate ti ∈ [0, ε] for each BR mechanism, the worst way to set the ti’s is to set them all equal.
The following is a slight generalization of Lemma 5.4 from Dong et al. [5].
Lemma 4.4. For any ε, ε′ > 0, εg ∈ R, and t ∈ [0, ε]k−m × [0, ε′]m,
δ((t1, ε), (t2, ε), · · · (tk−m, ε), (tk−m+1, ε′), · · · , (tk, ε′); εg)
≤ δ
((
t1 + t2
2
, ε
)
,
(
t1 + t2
2
, ε
)
, (t3, ε), · · · , (tk−m, ε), (tk−m+1, ε′), · · · , (tk, ε′); εg
)
Hence, we can simplify our expression for δOPT substantially to the following where we use the
fact that pε,t = e
−tqε,t and 1− pε,t = eε−t(1− qε,t)
δOPT((MBR(ε), · · · ,MBR(ε),MDP(ε), · · · ,MDP(ε)) ; εg) (3)
= sup
t∈[0,ε]
∑
S1⊆S1
∑
S2⊆S2
[
q
m−|S2|
2ε,ε (1− q2ε,ε)|S2|qk−m−|S1|ε,t (1− qε,t)|S1|
−eεgpm−|S2|2ε,ε (1− p2ε,ε)|S2|pk−m−|S1|ε,t (1− pε,t)|S1|
]
+
= sup
t∈[0,ε]
k−m∑
i=0
m∑
j=0
(
k −m
i
)(
m
j
)
qm−j2ε,ε (1− q2ε,ε)jqk−m−iε,t (1− qε,t)i
[
1− eεg−ε(m−2j−i)−t(k−m)
]
+
.
(4)
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We now want to show that the supt∈[0,ε] can be decomposed into a max over a finite number of
values for t ∈ [0, ε]. We define the following function for t ∈ [0, ε]:
δm,k(t; εg) := δ((t, ε), · · · , (t, ε)︸ ︷︷ ︸
k−m
, (ε, 2ε), · · · , (ε, 2ε)︸ ︷︷ ︸
m
; εg).
We define the following function in terms of αi,j =
(
k−m
i
)(
m
j
)
qm−j2ε,ε (1−q2ε,ε)j when i ∈ {0, · · · k−
m} and j ∈ {0, · · · ,m} with αi,j = 0 otherwise.
F`(t) :=
∑`
n=0
(
1− eεg−ε(m−n)−t(k−m)
) ∑
i+2j=n
i∈{0,1··· ,k−m}
j∈{0,1,··· ,m}
αi,jq
k−m−i
ε,t (1− qε,t)j
The following result provides a more general version of Lemma 5.7 in [5], which is central to
showing that we need to only consider a few values of t ∈ [0, ε].
Lemma 4.5.
F ′`(t) =
1
1− e−ε
(
eεg−ε(m−`)−t(k−m) − et−ε
) ∑
i+2j=`
i∈{0,1··· ,k−m}
j∈{0,1,··· ,m}
αi,j(k −m− i)qk−m−i−1ε,t (1− qε,t)i
We relegate details of the proof to the appendix (B.1).
Given this result, we can limit our search for supt∈[0,ε] to a max over k + m terms. We then
have the main result of this section, which presents the formula for computing the optimal privacy
bound of k non-adaptively selected ε-DP mechanisms, where k −m of which are ε-BR.
Theorem 3. Consider the non-adaptive sequence of m manyMDP(ε) mechanisms and k−m many
MBR(ε) mechanisms. We define t` = εg+ε(`+1−m)k−m+1 if t` ∈ [0, ε], otherwise we round it to the closest
point in {0, ε}, for ` ∈ {0, · · · , k + m}. Then for ε, εg > 0 we have the following formula for
computing δOPT (MBR(ε1)× · · · ×MBR(εk−m)×MDP(εk−m+1)× · · · ×MDP(εk); εg) with εi = ε for
i ∈ [k].
max
`∈{0,··· ,k+m}
k−m∑
i=0
m∑
j=0
(
k −m
i
)(
m
j
)
qm−j2ε,ε (1− q2ε,ε)jqk−m−iε,t` (1− qε,t`)i
[
1− eεg−ε(m−2j−i)−t`(k−m)
]
+
Furthermore, this bound applies when the ordering of mechanisms can be adversarially chosen, prior
to any interaction.
Note that when m = k we recover the optimal privacy loss bounds for DP mechanisms from
[15, 18], and the expression in Theorem 3 becomes independent of t`. Hence, we do not need to
do a max over 2k + 1 terms, and it can be computed in O(k) time. When m = 0, we recover the
expression from Dong et al. [5] and it can be computed in O(k2) time. In the case when m = Θ(k)
our formula can take O(k3) time to calculate.
We present the family of curves for various values of m in Figure 2. These bounds allow us
to interpolate between the two previous optimal composition bounds for ε-DP mechanisms from
Kairouz et al. [15] (setting m = k) and ε-BR mechanisms from Dong et al. [5] (setting m = 0).
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Figure 2: We plot the value of δOPT from Theorem 3 for k many ε-DP mechanisms, of which k−m
are ε-BR.
5 Optimal Adaptive Composition Bounds
We next consider the adaptive setting, where each ε-BR mechanism can be selected as a function of
previous outcomes. From Dong et al. [5], we know that the privacy loss can strictly increase when
compared to the non-adaptive setting. We can use the privacy loss bounds from Lemma 3.3 here,
even in the heterogenous privacy parameter case. However, we can better understand the adaptive
setting by examining whether the ordering of DP and BR mechanisms can change the total privacy
loss. We have the following formulation of the optimal privacy loss for ε-BR mechanisms from
Dong et al. [5].
Lemma 5.1. Let ~M be a sequence of adaptively selected MBR(εi) and MDP(εi) where εi > 0 are
fixed in advance for i ∈ [k]. For any εg > 0 and setting δOPT(∅; εg) = [1− eεg ]+ we have:
δOPT(MBR(ε0), ~M; εg) = sup
t0∈[0,ε0]
{
qε0,t0δOPT(
~M; εg − t0) + (1− qε0,t0)δOPT( ~M; εg + ε0 − t0)
}
δOPT(MDP(ε0), ~M; εg) = q2ε0,ε0δOPT( ~M; εg − ε0) + (1− q2ε0,ε0)δOPT( ~M; εg + ε0)
As in the previous section, we will only consider a homogenous privacy parameter, ε > 0, and
leave the heterogenous case to future work.
We start with the following result that shows the worst case ordering is to select the BR
mechanisms all at the end of the entire interaction. Hence, we might be able to decrease the overall
privacy loss if it is known that the BR mechanisms will not all be selected at the end.
Proposition 1. Let ~M, ~M′ be two sequences of adaptively selected MBR and MDP mechanisms,
where either may be empty. We then have for any εg ≥ 0
δOPT( ~M,MBR,MDP, ~M′; εg) ≤ δOPT( ~M,MDP,MBR, ~M′; εg)
Proof. Let ~M consist of k′ many ε-BR mechanisms, which are in positions `1, · · · , `k′ . At each
level `, there will be 2`−1 many variables to maximize an expression over, which we will write
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the variables as tj,` ∈ [0, ε] where j ∈ [2`−1]. The full set of these variables can be written as
T = {ti,` : i ∈ [2`−1], ` ∈ {`1, · · · , `k′}}. Using the recursive formulation from Lemma 5.1, we know
that δOPT( ~M,MBR,MDP, ~M′; εg) will consist of a summation of terms with the following form, where
we take a sup over all t ∈ T for some coefficient λ(t; ε) and term α(t; ε, εg),
λ(t; ε) · δOPT(MBR,MDP, ~M;α(t; ε, εg)).
We then expand this term using our recurrence formula,
δOPT(MBR,MDP, ~M;α(t; ε, εg))
= sup
s∈[0,ε]
{
qε,sδOPT(MDP, ~M;α(t; ε, εg)− s) + (1− qε,s)δOPT(MDP, ~M;α(t; ε, εg) + ε− s)
}
= sup
s∈[0,ε]
{
qε,sq2ε,εδOPT( ~M;α(t; ε, εg)− s− ε) + qε,s(1− q2ε,ε)δOPT( ~M;α(t; ε, εg)− s+ ε)
+(1− qε,s)q2ε,εδOPT( ~M;α(t; ε, εg)− s) + (1− qε,s)(1− q2ε,ε)δOPT( ~M;α(t; ε, εg) + 2ε− s)
}
.
Similarly, δOPT( ~M,MDP,MBR, ~M′; εg) will consist of a summation of terms with the following
form, with the same terms λ(t; ε) and α(t; ε, εg)
λ(t; ε) · δOPT(MDP,MBR, ~M;α(t; ε, εg)).
Again, we use our recurrence formula to get the following
δOPT(MDP,MBR, ~M;α(t; ε, εg))
= q2ε,εδOPT(MBR, ~M;α(t; ε, εg)− ε) + (1− q2ε,ε)δOPT(MBR, ~M;α(t; ε, εg) + ε)
= q2ε,ε sup
s∈[0,ε]
{
qε,sδOPT( ~M;α(t; ε, εg)− s− ε) + (1− qε,s)δOPT( ~M;α(t; ε, εg)− s)
}
+ (1− q2ε,ε) sup
s′∈[0,ε]
{
qε,s′δOPT( ~M;α(t; ε, εg) + ε− s′) + (1− qε,s′)δOPT( ~M;α(t; ε, εg) + 2ε− s′)
}
= sup
s,s′∈[0,ε]
{
qε,sq2ε,εδOPT( ~M;α(t; ε, εg)− s− ε) + qε,s′(1− q2ε,ε)δOPT( ~M;α(t; ε, εg)− s′ + ε)
+(1− qε,s)q2ε,εδOPT( ~M;α(t; ε, εg)− s) + (1− qε,s′)(1− q2ε,ε)δOPT( ~M;α(t; ε, εg) + 2ε− s′)
}
Hence, δOPT(MBR,MDP, ~M;α(t; ε, εg)) and δOPT(MDP,MBR, ~M;α(t; ε, εg)) consists of the same terms,
except the former has a single sup and the latter takes a sup over two terms. Hence, we must have
λ(t) · δOPT(MBR,MDP, ~M;α(t; ε, εg)) ≤ λ(t; ε) · δOPT(MDP,MBR, ~M;α(t; ε, εg)).
Because this applies for each term in both δOPT( ~M,MBR,MDP, ~M′; εg) and when we switch the BR
and DP order δOPT( ~M,MDP,MBR, ~M′; εg), we have our result.
Although we have a worst case ordering of MBR and MDP mechanisms, we still want to know
if the ordering of these mechanisms leads to strictly larger privacy losses.
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5.1 Single BR Mechanism
We first consider a single BR mechanism MBR and k − 1 MDP mechanisms where each mechanism
can be selected adaptively. It turns out that a single ε-BR Mechanism is insufficient to induce a
difference in δOPT for different orderings of the mechanisms.
Proposition 2. Let ε > 0, N ∈ N, and let ~AN , ~BN be sequences of mechanisms (A1 . . .AN ),
(B1 . . .BN ) for which ∃kA, kB ∈ [N ] s.t. AkA ,BkB = MBR and for i 6= kA, j 6= kB Ai,Bj = MDP.
Then for all εg ∈ R and all ~AN , ~BN :
δOPT
(
~AN ; εg
)
= δOPT
(
~BN ; εg
)
.
The proof follows from definitions and case analysis. Details are in appendix (C.1).
Lemma 5.2. For ` ∈ N, x ∈ R, ε ≥ 0, and εi = ε for i ∈ {0, . . . , `} we define:
δ` (x) := δOPT (MDP(ε1), . . . ,MDP(ε`);x) .
Then we have the following identity for some constants λ`,i ∈ R:
δ` (x) =
∑
i∈{0,...,`}
λ`,i
[
1− e(2i−`)ε+x
]
+
.
The proof is by applying Lemma 5.1 and induction on `. Details are in appendix (C.2)
We now provide a proof sketch for Proposition 2, details are in appendix C.1.
Proof Sketch for Proposition 2. To prove this we induct on the number, N , of ε-DP mechanisms.
The base case (N = 2) follows from expanding both δOPT( ~A2; εg) and δOPT( ~B2; εg) using Lemma 5.1,
eliminating zero terms, and comparing. (See supplementary file)
Now, consider N > 2. Suppose that for k < N we have δOPT( ~Ak; εg) = δOPT( ~Bk; εg) for all ~Ak, ~Bk.
Then to show δOPT( ~AN ; εg) = δOPT( ~BN ; εg) there are two nontrivial cases to consider:
1. A1,B1 =MDP. Here we simply expand the first ε-DP mechanism on each side using definitions
and apply the inductive hypothesis.
2. A1 = MBR and B1 = MDP. The proof here is slightly more involved. First we expand the
first two terms of each side:
δOPT
(
~AN ; εg
)
=
sup
t∈[0,ε]
{
qt,ε [qε,2εδOPT (MDP, . . . ,MDP; εg − ε− t) + (1− qε,2ε) δOPT (MDP, . . . ,MDP; εg + ε− t)]
+ (1− qt,ε) [qε,2εδOPT (MDP, . . . ,MDP; εg − t) + (1− qε,2ε) δOPT (MDP, . . . ,MDP; εg + 2ε− t)]
}
.
δOPT
(
~BN ; εg
)
=
qε,2ε sup
t1∈[0,ε]
{
qt1,εδOPT (MDP, . . . ,MDP; εg − ε− t1) + (1− qt1,ε) δOPT (MDP, . . . ,MDP; εg − t1)
}
+ (1−
qε,2ε) sup
t2∈[0,ε]
{
qt2,εδOPT (MDP, . . . ,MDP; εg + ε− t2) + (1− qt2,ε) δOPT (MDP, . . . ,MDP; εg + 2ε− t2)
}
.
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First we expand the first two terms of each side, applying the inductive hypothesis to ~BN after
expanding the first term to ensure that the second mechanism is ε-BR wlog. Then, by applying
the summation and reduction formulas from Lemmas C.2 and C.1, for some C1(ε), C2(ε) ∈ R, we
can write:
δOPT
(
~AN ; εg
)
= sup
t∈[0,ε]
{
qε,2ε
(
C1(ε) + qt,ελi∗
[
1− eεg+(−1+2i∗−(N−2))ε−t
]
+
)
+ (1− qε,2ε)
(
C2(ε) + qt,ελi∗
[
1− eεg+(1+2i∗−(N−2))ε−t
]
+
)}
. (5)
δOPT
(
~BN ; εg
)
= qε,2ε sup
t1∈[0,ε]
{
C1(ε) + qt,ελi∗
[
1− eεg+(−1+2i∗−(N−2))ε−t1
]
+
}
+ (1− qε,2ε) sup
t2∈[0,ε]
{
C2(ε) + qt2,ελi∗
[
1− eεg+(1+2i∗−(N−2))ε−t2
]
+
}
. (6)
Then both remaining terms in δOPT( ~BN ; εg) achieve the supremum for the same argument t∗ =
t1 = t2. Fixing t = t
∗ in (10) and t1 = t2 = t∗ in (11) and comparing it is clear that δOPT( ~AN ; εg) ≥
δOPT( ~BN ; εg). By the triangle inequality, we also have δOPT( ~BN ; εg) ≥ δOPT( ~AN ; εg), which proves the
result.
The following corollary states that we can use the non-adaptive, optimal DP composition for-
mula from Theorem 3 with m = 1, even when the single BR mechanism can be adaptively selected
at any round.
Corollary 5.1. Let ~A be any sequence of k − 1 adaptively selected MDP mechanisms and a sin-
gle MBR that can be adaptively selected, e.g. ~A = (MDP, · · · ,MDP,MBR,MDP, · · · ,MDP). Then
δOPT( ~A; εg) can be computed with Theorem 3.
5.2 Ordering of BR and DP Impacts the Privacy Loss
To see that the privacy loss can strictly increase if we change the ordering of BR and DP mech-
anisms, we consider the following simple example where we compose k = 3 ε-DP mechanisms
adaptively and 2 of them are ε-BR. In this case, we can directly compute δOPT(·; εg) for each of the
three possible orderings of mechanisms.
Lemma 5.3. Let ε > 0 and εg ≥ 0. If εg ≥ ε, then we have
δOPT(MBR,MBR,MDP; εg) = δOPT(MBR,MDP,MBR; εg)
= δOPT(MDP,MBR,MBR; εg).
For εg ≤ ε we define the following functions:
x(t) := q2ε,ε
(
qε,tq
2
ε,
εg−t
2
(
1− e−ε)+ (1− qε,t)q2
ε,
εg+ε−t
2
(
1− e−ε))
y(t) := q2ε,ε
(
qε,t(1− eεg−ε−t) + (1− qε,t)q2
ε,
εg+ε−t
2
(
1− e−ε))
z(t) := (1− q2ε,ε)qε,tq2
ε,ε+
εg−t
2
(
1− e−ε) .
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We then can write out the following expressions:
δOPT(MDP,MBR,MBR; εg) = max
{
sup
t∈[0,εg)
x(t), sup
t∈[εg ,ε]
y(t)
}
+ sup
t′∈[εg ,ε]
z(t′)
δOPT(MBR,MDP,MBR; εg) = max
{
sup
t∈[0,εg)
x(t), sup
t∈[εg ,ε]
y(t) + z(t)
}
δOPT(MBR,MBR,MDP; εg) = max
{
sup
t∈[0,εg)
x(t), sup
t∈[εg ,ε]
y(t) + z(t)
}
.
The proof requires several technical details and is left to the appendix (C.2).
From this, we can also obtain the following result, which demonstrates that the ordering of the
mechanisms changes the overall privacy loss.
Lemma 5.4. Let 0 ≤ εg < ε. Then
δOPT(MDP,MBR,MBR; εg) > δOPT(MBR,MDP,MBR; εg).
Furthermore, for x(t), y(t), z(t) defined in Lemma 5.3, we have
δOPT(MDP,MBR,MBR; εg) =
 x(ε/2) + z
(
2ε+εg
3
)
if εg ≥ ε/2
y
(
ε+εg
3
)
+ z
(
2ε+εg
3
)
else
δOPT(MBR,MDP,MBR; εg) =
{
max{x(ε/2), y(εg) + z(εg)} if εg ≥ ε/2
max{x(εg), y(ε/2) + z(ε/2)} else
Again the proof is relegated to the appendix (C.3).
Knowing that there is a difference in the overall privacy loss when an analyst changes the
order of BR and DP mechanisms, we then plot the ratio between δOPT(MBR,MDP,MBR; εg) and
δOPT(MDP,MBR,MBR; εg) in Figure 3.
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Figure 3: The absolute difference (left) and the ratio (right) between δOPT(MBR,MDP,MBR; εg) and
δOPT(MDP,MBR,MBR; εg) with ε = 1.0 and varying εg < ε.
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6 Comparing Gaussian and Laplace Mechanisms for Private His-
tograms
In this section, we compare the Laplace mechanism and the Gaussian mechanism over multiple
rounds of composition. Before we consider composition, the main distinguishing feature of which
noise to use, Laplace or Gaussian, mainly relies on which sensitivity bound we have on the quantity
we want to add noise to. We now define `p-sensitivity of a given function f : X → Rd,
∆p(f) := max
x∼x′
||f(x)− f(x′)||p.
Typically, if we have a bound on `1-sensitivity we would use the Laplace mechanism, whereas if
we have a bound on `2-sensitivity we would use the Gaussian mechanism, since each mechanism
adds noise with standard deviation proportional to the `1 or `2 sensitivity, respectively. In machine
learning applications, one typically normalizes high dimensional vectors by some `2 bound, so it is
then natural to use Gaussian noise, not to mention the moment accounting composition that also
takes advantage of subsampling at each round of stochastic gradient descent [1].
However, when one wants to privatize counts from a histogram, one typically does not have
only an `1 or `2 sensitivity bound. Rather, one has a bound on the number of distinct counts a
user can contribute to in the histogram, i.e. an `0-sensitivity bound, and a bound on the amount a
user can impact a single element’s count, i.e, an `∞-sensitivity bound. Obviously, we can convert
these bounds to `1 or `2 sensitivity bounds. Let τ be the `∞-sensitivity and ∆ be the `0-sensitivity
of the histogram h ∈ Nd, computed on the input data. We then have
∆1(h) = τ∆, ∆2(h) = τ
√
∆.
Hence, it would seem better to use the Gaussian mechanism to release counts, since the `2-
sensitivity can be much lower than the `1-sensitivity, thus leading to more accurate counts. We
have the following result from Balle and Wang [2] that gives the smallest scale of noise for the
Gaussian mechanism with a given `2-sensitivity and overall privacy guarantee.
Lemma 6.1 (Analytic Gauss [2]). Let f : X → Rd have `2-sensitivity ∆2, then for any ε > 0 and
δ ∈ (0, 1] we have M(x) = N (f(x),∆22σ2Id) is (ε, δ)-DP if and only if
Φ
(
1
2σ
− εσ
)
− eεΦ
(
− 1
2σ
− εσ
)
≤ δ
We now discuss how we can actually bound the privacy loss of the Laplace mechanism by
considering composition of ∆ (`0-sensitivity) many DP mechanisms.
Lemma 6.2. Consider a function f : X → Rd with `0-sensitivity ∆ and `∞-sensitivity τ . Then
the Laplace mechanism with parameter ε > 0
f(x) + (Z1, · · · , Zd), {Zi : i ∈ [d]} i.i.d.∼ Lap(τ/ε).
is (εg, δOPT(MDP(ε1), · · · ,MDP(ε∆); εg))-DP for εg ≥ 0 and εi = ε.
Proof. Note that we fix neighboring datasets, x, x′ which induces two function values f(x), f(x′)
that differ in at most ∆ positions, and in each position they differ by at most τ . Since we fix the
neighboring datasets, we also know the ∆ positions that have changed. Hence, we need to only
consider the contributions to the overall privacy loss in these ∆ positions, while the other positions
contribute zero to the overall privacy loss and can be dropped.
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Note that a similar argument can be made with the Gaussian mechanisms, given the `0-
sensitivity. For this, we will analyze the mechanism using zCDP from Definition 2.7.
Using a similar argument to Lemma 6.2 and using the composition property of zCDP from Bun
and Steinke [4], we have the following result, which can be optimized over α > 1.
Lemma 6.3. Consider a function f : X → Rd with `0-sensitivity ∆ and `∞-sensitivity τ . Then
the Gaussian mechanism
f(x) + (Z1, · · · , Zd), {Zi : i ∈ [d]} i.i.d.∼ N
(
0, τ2σ2
)
.
is ( ∆
2σ2
+ 1σ
√
2∆ ln(1/δ), δ)-DP for any δ > 0.
6.1 Results
Given an `0-sensitivity bound, we then want to compare the various bounds of the Gaussian mech-
anism from Lemma 6.1 and Lemma 6.3 with our Laplace mechanism bound from Lemma 6.2. In
order to compare the utility of the Laplace and Gaussian mechanisms, we will fix the variances
to be the same between them and set δ > 0 to be the same across.2 We present the comparisons
in Figure 4. Note that for relatively small `0-sensitivities, we get an improvement in the overall
privacy guarantee with the Laplace mechanism, but then Gaussian noise seems to win out as the
`0-sensitivity increases.
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Figure 4: Comparison of the overall DP guarantee with δ = 10−6, with “Laplace Noise” being the
bound in Lemma 6.2, “Optimal Gaussian with `2-sensitivity” being the bound in Lemma 6.1, and
“Gaussian Noise with zCDP” being the bound in Lemma 6.3. Note that we equalize the standard
deviations between the Laplace and Gaussian noise.
We are not just concerned with the overall DP parameters for a one-shot mechanism; we also
want to consider composition. In order to apply composition for Lemma 6.1, we will use the optimal
DP composition bound from [18] over k different mechanisms with `0-sensitivity ∆ and find the
smallest εg value for the given σ and overall δ. We present the results in Figure 5.
Note the bounds for “Laplace Noise” and “Gaussian Noise with zCDP” do not change between
Figures 4 and 5, since the bounds consider composing k · ∆-mechanisms which varies from 20 to
2Note that the variance of Lap(b) is 2b2.
21
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
k-composition
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
Pr
iv
ac
y 
Lo
ss
 B
ou
nd
 
g
Privacy Composition Bounds with =  0.01 and =  10
Laplace Noise
Optimal Gaussian with l2-Sensitivity
Gaussian Noise with zCDP
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
k-composition
2
4
6
8
10
Pr
iv
ac
y 
Lo
ss
 B
ou
nd
 
g
Privacy Composition Bounds with =  0.10 and =  10
Laplace Noise
Optimal Gaussian with l2-Sensitivity
Gaussian Noise with zCDP
Figure 5: Similar to Figure 4, we now consider composition with k mechanisms, each adding noise
to a `0-sensitivity ∆ = 10 function.
100 in Figure 5. We see that the best one-shot mechanism then does not provide a small privacy
loss when composing several mechanisms. From the empirical results, we see that the Gaussian
mechanisms typically have smaller accumulated privacy loss after a large enough k, however for a
reasonable number of compositions, Laplace outperforms Gaussian.
6.2 Gaussian Based Private Top-k Mechanisms
Given the results above, we then propose variants of existing mechanisms that use Gaussian noise
rather than Laplace noise. From Rogers et al. [19], we have the following table of mechanisms for
data analytics based on histogram data. In the ∆-restricted sensitivity setting we assume that
the number of categories a single user can impact is at most ∆ (i.e.the `0-sensitivity) and the
unrestricted sensitivity setting has no such restriction, but requires limiting the output to the top-
k. Furthermore, the known domain setting is where the algorithms are given the set of categories
over the histogram (the labels for the x-axis), because they cannot be given by the data. Whereas
the unknown domain has no such restriction and must have a parameter d¯ for an upper bound
on the number of distinct elements the histogram can have. Each setting requires a `∞-sensitivity
bound τ .
∆-restricted sensitivity unrestricted sensitivity
Known
Domain KnownLap∆,τ [10] KnownGumbk,τ [16]
Unknown
Domain UnkLap∆,d¯,τ [19] UnkGumbk,d¯,τ [19]
Table 1: DP algorithms for various data analytics tasks
Rather than present each algorithm here, we summarize each one and present a variant of it using
Gaussian noise. The KnownLap∆,τ mechanism can easily be replaced with a Gaussian mechanism
that adds Gaussian noise to each count with τσ standard deviation to ensure ( ∆
2σ2
,
√
∆
σ )-CDP [8]
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and ∆
2σ2
-zCDP [4] since at most ∆ bins in neighboring histograms can change.
The unrestricted sensitivity algorithms are based on the exponential mechanism (using Gumbel
noise) to first discover the elements in the top-k and then use the Laplace mechanism to release
noisy counts on the discovered elements. A simple modification of this algorithm is to still use
exponential mechanisms to discover the elements but then use Gaussian noise on the resulting
counts. Hence, adding Gaussian noise to the count of each discovered element with τσ standard
deviation will guarantee ( k
2σ2
,
√
k
σ )-CDP and
k
2σ2
-zCDP. However, this ignores a useful detail that
the first phase of exponential mechanisms is giving, a ranked list of elements. Hence, we propose
a simple post processing function of the Gaussian mechanism that will respect the order given by
the first phase of domain discovery. We solve a constrained least squares problem to return the
maximum likelihood estimator for the true counts given an ordering. We present the CountMLEσ
procedure in Algorithm 1. Because this is a post-processing function of the Gaussian mechanism,
Algorithm 1 CountMLEσ; Return noisy counts subject to a fixed ordering
Input: Histogram h = h1, · · · , hk of k elements with `∞-sensitivity τ and an ordering i1, i2, · · · ik.
Output: Noisy counts h˜i1 , h˜i2 , · · · , h˜ik .
Add noise hˆ = (h1, · · · , hk) + (Z1, · · · , Zk) where Zi ∼ N
(
0, τ2σ2
)
.
Solve the following and let h˜ = (h˜1, · · · , h˜k) be the solution:
min
x
||hˆ− x||2 (7)
s.t. xi1 ≥ · · · ≥ xik ≥ 0
Return (h˜i1 , · · · , h˜ik).
the privacy parameters remain the same given the outcome of CountMLEσ. Note that we could use
an `1 loss to find the MLE when using Laplace noise, however this would not guarantee a unique
solution. An additional advantage of using the `2 loss is that we can use standard constrained least
squares numerical methods, e.g. ‘nnls’ in scipy.
We give the comparison between CountMLEσ and simply adding Laplace noise to the counts
with the same overall privacy budget in Figure 6 and `∞-sensitivity of τ = 1. In particular we
consider the top-25 words in Macbeth and fix ε = 0.1 in KnownLap25,1. We then compute the overall
privacy parameter with δ = 10−6 using the optimal composition bound to get ε′(δ) = 2.08. Solving
for σ in Lemma 6.3 with the given total ′(δ) and δ = 10−6, we get σ = 13.1. We then ran the
two privatized count algorithms over 100 trials and plot 1 standard deviation from the empirical
average. From the figure, we can see that CountMLEσ has smaller error for smaller counts than the
basic Laplace mechanism with the same privacy guarantee.
Next, we consider the unknown domain and ∆-restricted sensitivity setting. The procedure
UnkLap∆,d¯,τ from [19] adds Laplace noise to the d¯ counts that it has access to from the true
histogram and adds Laplace noise proportional to ∆τ/ to each count. Then it adds a data
dependent threshold, which also has Laplace noise added to it and only returns the elements above
the noisy threshold. The resulting algorithm is (, δ)-DP. We propose a variant of this algorithm
using a symmetric truncated Gaussian, which we write as NT
(
µ, σ2
)
with truncation value T > 0
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Figure 6: Comparison of (2.08, 10−6)-DP noise addition mechanisms given a fixed ordering.
that has the following density fT for µ− T ≤ z ≤ µ+ T ,
fT (z;µ, σ) =
1
σ
φ
( z−µ
σ
)
Φ
(
T
σ
)− Φ (−Tσ ) .
and otherwise fT (z;µ, σ) = 0. The procedure TruncGauss
∆,d¯,τ is presented in Algorithm 2. In
related work, Geng et al. [12] studied the privacy and utility of a truncated Laplace and showed
the benefits of it over Gaussian noise when satisfying an (, δ)-DP claim.
Lemma 6.4. The procedure TruncGauss∆,d¯,τ is δ-approximately
(
0, ∆
2σ2
)
-zCDP.
Proof. We begin by proving that for a single count NT
(
hi, τ
2σ2
)
ensures δ/∆-approximate ρ-zCDP.
This follows a similar analysis as in [12] to prove truncated Laplace noise ensures approximate DP.
WLOG, let h′i = hi+τ . We consider the event E = {h′i−T ≤ NT
(
hi, τ
2σ2
) ≤ hi+T} and compute
its probability,
Pr[E] =
∫ hi+T
h′i−T
fT (z;hi, τσ)dz =
Φ
(
T
τσ
)− Φ ( τ−Tτσ )
Φ
(
T
τσ
)− Φ (−Tτσ ) .
Further, we consider the event E′ = {h′i − T ≤ NT
(
h′i, τ
2σ2
) ≤ hi + T}. Due to symmetry,
we have Pr[E] = Pr[E′]. Note that we set T so that for a given δ > 0 we solve (8), hence
Pr[E] = Pr[E′] ≤ δ/∆. We then consider the Re´nyi divergence between two truncated Gaussians
conditioned on the events that their supports overlap. Consider the scale α > 1 and set constant
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Algorithm 2 TruncGauss∆,d¯,τ ; Truncated Gaussian mechanism over unknown domain with access
to largest d¯ elements, `∞-sensitivity τ , and ∆-restricted sensitivity.
Input: Histogram h, ∆ sensitivity, cut off at d¯+ 1, and , δ.
Output: Ordered set of indices and counts.
Sort h(1) ≥ h(2) ≥ · · · ≥ h(d¯+1).
Set T to solve the following expression
δ = ∆
(
1− Φ
(
T
τσ
)− Φ ( τ−Tτσ )
Φ
(
T
τσ
)− Φ (−Tτσ )
)
(8)
S = ∅
for i ≤ d¯ do
Set vi = NT
(
h(i), τ
2σ2
)
if vi > hd¯+1 + τ + T then
S ← S ∪ {(i, vi)}
Return S
c = 1√
2piτ2σ2
1
Φ( Tτσ )−Φ( τ−Tτσ )
.
exp
(
(α− 1)Dα(NT
(
hi, τ
2σ2
) |E ||NT (h′i, τ2σ2) |E′))
= c ·
∫ hi+T
h′i−T
exp
(
−α
(
(z − hi)2
2τ2σ2
)
− (1− α)
(
(z − h′i)2
2τ2σ2
))
dz
= c ·
∫ hi+T
h′i−T
exp
( −1
2τ2σ2
((
z − (αhi + (1− α)h′i)
)2 − (αhi + (1− α)h′i)2 + αh2i + (1− α)h′2i )) dz
= c · exp
(
α(α− 1)
2σ2
)
·
∫ hi+T
h′i−T
exp
( −1
2τ2σ2
(
z − (αhi + (1− α)h′i)
)2)
dz
= exp
(
α(α− 1)
2σ2
) Φ(T−(1−α)ττσ )− Φ (ατ−Tτσ )
Φ
(
T
τσ
)− Φ ( τ−Tτσ ) ≤ exp
(
α(α− 1)
2σ2
)
.
The last inequality holds due to the fact that the numerator is smaller than the denominator for
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all α > 1. We next consider switching the order in the divergence. Let c′ = 1√
2piτ2σ2
1
Φ(T−ττσ )−Φ(−Tτσ )
exp
(
(α− 1)Dα(NT
(
h′i, τ
2σ2
) |E′ ||NT (hi, τ2σ2) |E))
= c′ ·
∫ hi+T
h′i−T
exp
(
−α
(
(z − h′i)2
2τ2σ2
)
− (1− α)
(
(z − hi)2
2τ2σ2
))
dz
= c′ ·
∫ hi+T
h′i−T
exp
( −1
2τ2σ2
(
z − (αh′i + (1− α)hi)
)2 − ((αh′i + (1− α)hi)2 + αh′2i + (1− α)h2i )) dz
= c′ · exp
(
α(α− 1)
2σ2
)
·
∫ hi+T
h′i−T
exp
( −1
2τ2σ2
(
z − (αh′i + (1− α)hi)
)2)
dz
= exp
(
α(α− 1)
2σ2
) Φ (T−αττσ )− Φ( (1−α)τ−Tτσ )
Φ
(
T−τ
τσ
)− Φ (−Tτσ ) ≤ exp
(
α(α− 1)
2σ2
)
.
Hence, truncation only reduces the Re´nyi divergence between two shifted Gaussians. We then have
Dα(NT
(
hi, τ
2σ2
) |E ||NT (h′i, τ2σ2) |E′) ≤ α2σ2 .
Now consider the setting where we have access to the full histogram and use the truncated Gaussian
noise for each count. In this case, we can apply zCDP composition on the ∆ counts that changed in
neighboring histograms, hence by applying a union bound over the events E and E′ for each count,
the result is a δ-approximate ∆
2σ2
-zCDP mechanism. We then apply post-processing to only return
elements that are above the threshold hd¯+ τ +T . Recall that post-processing does not increase the
privacy parameters. Note that any element whose true count is less than hd¯ + τ can never appear
in the result, due to the truncated noise. In a neighboring dataset a user can cause an element
whose true count is at most h(d¯) (i.e. not in the top-d¯) to have new count of at most h(d¯) + τ , and
thus cannot appear in the result from the neighboring dataset. Hence the privacy analysis is the
same whether the algorithm has access to the full histogram (not just the top-d¯) and only releases
counts above the threshold as opposed to only having access to d¯, adding noise to those counts,
and only releasing counts above a threshold.
Note that in repeated calls to TruncGauss∆i,d¯i,τi , where each round i may have different pa-
rameter values, we can apply zCDP composition to get an overall privacy guarantee over the entire
interaction.
See Figure 7 for a plot of the truncation level T from (8) for various values of σ and δ, while
fixing τ = 1 and ∆ = 1. We present our truncated Gaussian mechanism TruncGauss∆,d¯,τ in
Algorithm 2 based on truncated Gaussian noise, which will ensure δ-approximate zCDP. We have
the following privacy claim.
7 Conclusion
In this work, we have considered the impact to the overall privacy loss when an analyst can select
different types of private mechanisms, including pure DP, BR, and CDP. We developed more
general bounds on the privacy loss when the analyst can select the type of mechanism and the
privacy parameters adaptively at each round, as long as the privacy parameters are predetermined
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Figure 7: Plotting the truncation level T computed in (8). We fix `0-sensitivity ∆ = 1 and `∞-
sensitivity τ = 1. Note that the x-axis varies ln(1/δ), as that is the scaling of the threshold value
in UnkLap1,d¯,1.
and selected without replacement, thus unifying different works on bounding the privacy loss under
composition. We then considered the optimal DP composition bounds when an analyst may select
at most m pure DP mechanisms and the remaining k − m mechanisms are BR, both with the
same privacy parameter, i.e. the homogeneous case. In the non-adaptive setting, we computed the
optimal DP composition bound, which allows us to smoothly interpolate between the bounds from
[15], i.e. m = k and the bounds from [5], i.e. m = 0. In the adaptive homogeneous setting, we
showed that the placement of a single BR mechanism does not change the composition bound, but
provided an example with two BR mechanisms where ordering does impact privacy loss.
Although our optimal privacy loss bounds only apply when we combine pure DP and BR
mechanisms, we also studied the Gaussian mechanism (a standard CDP mechanism) with different
types of analyses and how it compares to the Laplace mechanism (a standard DP mechanism) for
releasing private histograms. Given an `0 and `∞-sensitivity for a histogram, the best mechanism,
i.e. the one with the smallest privacy loss with a fixed standard deviation, is not obvious, especially
if one considers composition. We then provided new algorithms that utilize Gaussian noise for the
existing algorithms in LinkedIn’s privacy system.
We see lots of interesting directions for future work. As discussed in Dong et al. [5], determining
the computational complexity of the optimal DP composition for adaptively selected BR mecha-
nisms, even in the homogenous case, is incredibly interesting. We found that with 3 mechanisms,
2 of which are BR, the arg sup values were weighted sums of ε and εg. Does this generalize beyond
k = 3? Further, for composition of heterogenous DP mechanisms, does the ordering of the privacy
parameters matter if they can be adaptively selected?
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A Omitted Proofs of Section 3
Proof of Lemma 3.1. We first show the following for λ > 0:
E
[
exp
(
λ
k∑
i=0
Xi
)]
≤ exp(λ2b2/2) (9)
By our hypothesis, we have that
E[eλXi−λ
2B2i /2 | Fi−1] ≤ 1 ∀i
Furthermore, we have that Mk = exp
(
λ
∑k
i=0Xi − λ2/2
∑k
i=0B
2
i
)
is a supermartingale, due to
the following
E[Mk|Fk−1] = E
[
exp
(
λ
k∑
i=0
Xi − λ2/2
k∑
i=0
B2i
)
| Fk−1
]
= exp
(
λ
k−1∑
i=0
Xi − λ2/2
k−1∑
i=0
B2i
)
E
[
eλXk−λ
2B2k/2 | Fk−1
]
≤ exp
(
λ
k−1∑
i=0
Xi − λ2/2
k−1∑
i=0
B2i
)
= Mk−1.
Hence, we have E[Mk] ≤ 1. Using our assumption that
∑k
i=0B
2
i ≤ b, we have the following
E
[
exp
(
λ
k∑
i=0
Xi − λ2b2/2
)]
≤ E
[
exp
(
λ
k∑
i=0
Xi − λ2
k∑
i=0
B2i /2
)]
≤ 1
and hence (9) holds. We can now prove the result using a standard argument involving Markov’s
inequality.
Pr[
k∑
i=0
Xi > β] = Pr[e
λ
∑k
i=0Xi−λ2b2/2 ≥ eλβ−λ2b2/2] ≤ 1
eλβ−λ2b2/2
We then set λ = β
b2
to get the result.
B Omitted Proofs of Section 4
B.1 Proof of Lemma 4.5
Proof. To simplify notation, we use k′ = k −m and qε,t = qt. We have the following recurrence
relation for F`(t) = F`−1(t) + f`(t) where
f`(t) =
(
1− eεg−ε(m−`)−tk′
) ∑
i+2j=`
i∈{0,1··· ,k′}
j∈{0,1,··· ,m}
αi,jq
k′−i
t (1− qt)j
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We then prove the statement by using induction F ′`(t) = F
′
`−1(t) + f
′
`(t). We start with the base
case,
F ′0(t) =
(
k′ · eεg−εm−tk′
)
α0,0q
k′
t +
(
1− eεg−εm−tk′
)
α0,0k
′qk
′−1
t q
′
t
=
k′α0,0
1− e−ε q
k′−1
t
(
eεg−εm−tk
′
(1− et−ε)− et−ε
(
1− eεg−εm−tk′
))
=
k′α0,0
1− e−ε q
k′−1
t
(
eε−εm−tk
′ − et−ε
)
We now present the derivative of f`(t). Note that we drop the condition in the summation where
i ∈ {0, · · · , k′} and j ∈ {0, · · · ,m} to ease the notation.
f ′`(t) = k
′eεg−ε(m−`)−tk
′ ∑
i+2j=`
αi,jq
k′−i
t (1− qt)i
+
(
1− eεg−ε(m−`)−tk′
) ∑
i+2j=`
αi,j
(
(k′ − i)qk′−i−1t (1− qt)iq′t − iqk−it (1− qt)i−1q′t
)
=
∑
i+2j=`
αi,jq
k′−i−1
t (1− qt)i−1(
k′eεg−ε(m−`)−tk
′
qt(1− qt) + q′t
(
1− eεg−ε(m−`)−tk′
) (
(k′ − i)(1− qt)− iqt
))
We now factor out a 1/(1− e−ε)2 and the inner term becomes.
(∗) :=k′eεg−ε(m−`)−tk′ (1− et−ε) (et−ε − e−ε)
− et−ε
(
1− eεg−ε(m−`)−tk′
) (
(k′ − i)(et−ε − e−ε)− i(1− et−ε))
= k′eεg−ε(m−`)−tk
′ (
et−ε − e−ε − e2(t−ε) + et−2ε
)
−
(
et−ε − eεg−ε(m−`+1)−t(k′−1)
) (
(k′ − i)(et−ε − e−ε)− i(1− et−ε))
= k′
(
eεg−ε(m−`+1)−t(k
′−1) − eεg−ε(m−`+1)−tk′ − eεg−ε(m−`+2)−t(k′−2) + eεg−ε(m−`+2)−t(k′−1)
)
− (k′ − i)
(
e2(t−ε) − eεg−ε(m−`+2)−t(k′−2) − et−2ε + eεg−ε(m−`+2)−t(k′−1)
)
+ i
(
et−ε − eεg−ε(m−`+1)−t(k′−1) − e2(t−ε) + eεg−ε(m−`+2)−t(k′−2)
)
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We now use the inductive claim to prove the statement. We use the fact that αi,j(k
′ − i) =
αi+1,j(i+ 1)
F ′`(t) =
1
1− e−ε
(
eεg−ε(m−`+1)−tk
′ − et−ε
) ∑
i+2j=`−1
αi,j(k
′ − i)qk′−i−1ε,t (1− qε,t)i
+
∑
i+2j=`
αi,j
qk
′−i−1
t (1− qt)i−1
(1− e−ε)2 · (∗)
=
1
(1− e−ε)2
∑
i+2j=`−1
(i+ 1)αi+1,j
(
eεg−ε(m−`+1)−tk
′ − et−ε
)
qk
′−i−1
t (1− qt)i(1− e−ε)
+
∑
i+2j=`
αi,j
qk
′−i−1
t (1− qt)i−1
(1− e−ε)2 · (∗)
=
1
(1− e−ε)2
∑
i+2j=`
αi,j
(
eεg−ε(m−`+1)−tk
′ − et−ε
)
qk
′−i
t (1− qt)i−1(1− e−ε)i
+
1
(1− e−ε)2
∑
i+2j=`
αi,jq
k′−i−1
t (1− qt)i−1 · (∗)
=
1
(1− e−ε)2
∑
i+2j=`
αi,jq
k′−i−1
t (1− qt)i−1
(
i
(
eεg−ε(m−`+1)−tk
′ − et−ε
)
(1− et−ε) + (∗)
)
We now expand the inner term by combining like terms with the i coefficient.
i
((
eεg−ε(m−`+1)−tk
′ − et−ε
)
(1− et−ε) +
(
et−ε − eεg−ε(m−`+1)−t(k′−1) − e2(t−ε) + eεg−ε(m−`+2)−t(k′−2)
))
= i
(
eεg−ε(m−`+1)−tk
′ − eεg−ε(m−`+2)−t(k′−1) − eεg−ε(m−`+1)−t(k′−1) + eεg−ε(m−`+2)−t(k′−2)
)
Note that this is the same term as the negative of the coefficient on k′. We then combine the terms
with (k′ − i) coefficient.
−(k′ − i)
(
eεg−ε(m−`+1)−tk
′ − eεg−ε(m−`+2)−t(k′−1) − eεg−ε(m−`+1)−t(k′−1) + eεg−ε(m−`+2)−t(k′−2)
)
−(k′ − i)
(
e2(t−ε) − eεg−ε(m−`+2)−t(k′−2) − et−2ε + eεg−ε(m−`+2)−t(k′−1)
)
= −(k′ − i)
(
e2(t−ε) − et−2ε + eεg−ε(m−`+1)−tk′ − eεg−ε(m−`+1)−t(k′−1)
)
= (k′ − i)(et−ε − e−ε)
(
eεg−ε(m−`)−tk
′ − et−ε
)
Putting this altogether, we have the following.
F ′`(t) =
1
(1− e−ε)2
∑
i+2j=`
αi,jq
k′−i−1
t (1− qt)i−1(k′ − i)(et−ε − e−ε)
(
eεg−ε(m−`)−tk
′ − et−ε
)
=
1
1− e−ε
(
eεg−ε(m−`)−tk
′ − et−ε
) ∑
i+2j=`
αi,j(k − i)qk′−i−1t (1− qt)i
This proves the statement.
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C Omitted Proofs of Section 5
C.1 Proof of Proposition 2:
Before we prove Proposition 2 we need the following two lemmas. The first provides an identity for
reducing elemental terms to expressions independent of t (similar to an identity used previously in
Dong et al. [5]). The next lemma provides an expansion of δOPT for k pure DP mechanismsMDP(ε).
Lemma C.1 (Reduction Identity). Given α ∈ R, ε > 0, and t ∈ [0, ε] , we have the identity:
qt,ε
[
1− eα−t]
+
+ (1− qt,ε)
[
1− eα+ε−t]
+
=

0 if α− t ≥ 0
qt,ε
(
1− eα−t) if α ≤ t ≤ α+ ε
1− eα otherwise
.
Proof. When α− t ≥ 0 we have 1− eα−t < 0 and 1− eα+ε−t < 0, hence
qt,ε
[
1− eα−t]
+
+ (1− qt,ε)
[
1− eα+ε−t]
+
= 0.
When α ≤ t ≤ α+ ε we have 1− eα+ε−t < 0, hence
qt,ε
[
1− eα−t]
+
+ (1− qt,ε)
[
1− eα+ε−t]
+
= qt,ε
[
1− eα−t]
+
.
When α+ ε− t ≤ 0 we have
qt,ε
[
1− eα−t]
+
+ (1− qt,ε)
[
1− eα+ε−t]
+
= qt,ε
(
1− eα−t)+ (1− qt,ε) (1− eα+ε−t)
= qt,ε + 1− qt,ε − [qt,ε + eε (1− qt,ε)] eα−t
= 1−
[
1− et−ε
1− e−ε + e
ε
(
1− 1− e
t−ε
1− e−ε
)]
eα−t
= 1− e
t − et−ε
1− e−ε e
α−t
= 1− eα.
Lemma C.2. For ` ∈ N, x ∈ R, ε ≥ 0, and εi = ε for i ∈ {0, . . . , `} we define:
δ` (x) := δOPT (MDP(ε1), . . . ,MDP(ε`);x) .
Then we have the following identity for some constants λ`,i ∈ R:
δ` (x) =
∑
i∈{0,...,`}
λ`,i
[
1− e(2i−`)ε+x
]
+
.
34
Proof. This is a straightforward induction on `. The base case ` = 1 is apparent from the recurrence
in Lemma 5.1. If we have ` > 1 and the identity holds for `′ < ` then we have:
δ` (x) = qε,2εδ`−1 (x− ε) + (1− qε,2ε) δ`−1 (x+ ε)
= qε,2ε
∑
i∈{0,...,`−1}
λ`−1,i
[
1− e(2i−`+1)ε+x−ε
]
+
+ (1− qε,2ε)
∑
i∈{0,...,`−1}
λ`−1,i
[
1− e(2i−`+1)ε+x+ε
]
+
= qε,2ελ`−1,0
[
1− e(−`ε+x)
]
+
+
∑
i∈{1,...,`−1}
(qε,2ελ`−1,i + (1− qε,2ε)λ`−1,i−1)
[
1− e(2i−`+1)ε+x−ε
]
+
+ (1− qε,2ε)λ`−1,`−1
[
1− e(`ε+x)
]
+
=
∑
i∈{0,...,`}
λ`,i
[
1− e(2i−`)ε+x
]
+
.
We can now complete the proof of Proposition 2.
Proof of Proposition 2. To prove this we induct on the number, N , of ε-DP mechanisms. For the
base case (N = 2) consider the expansion of the first two terms (using Lemma 5.1):
δOPT
(
~A2; εg
)
= sup
t∈[0,ε]
{
qt,ε
[
qε,2ε
[
1− eεg−ε−t]
+
+ (1− qε,2ε)
[
1− eεg+ε−t]
+
]
+ (1− qt,ε)
[
qε,2ε
[
1− eεg−t]
+
+ (1− qε,2ε)
[
1− eεg+2ε−t]
+
]}
δOPT
(
~B2; εg
)
= qε,2ε sup
t1∈[0,ε]
{
qt1,ε
[
1− eεg−ε−t1]
+
+ (1− qt1,ε)
[
1− eεg−t1]
+
}
+ (1− qε,2ε) sup
t2∈[0,ε]
{
qt2,ε
[
1− eεg+ε−t2]
+
+ (1− qt2,ε)
[
1− eεg+2ε−t2]
+
}
Where the terms with positive coefficients that depend on ε must be 0, so the sup
t2∈[0,ε]
term in
δOPT (B2; εg) disappears and equality is apparent.
Now, consider some N > 2. Suppose that for k < N we have δOPT
(
~Ak; εg
)
= δOPT
(
~Bk; εg
)
for
all ~Ak, ~Bk. Then to show δOPT
(
~AN ; εg
)
= δOPT
(
~BN ; εg
)
there are two nontrivial cases to consider:
1. A1,B1 = MDP(ε). Here we simply expand the first ε-DP mechanism on each side using
definitions and apply the inductive hypothesis.
2. A1 = MBR(ε) and B1 = MDP(ε). Here the proof is slightly more involved. First we expand
the first two terms of each side:
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Now consider the second case.
δOPT
(
~AN ; εg
)
= sup
t∈[0,ε]
{
qt,ε [qε,2εδOPT (MDP(ε), . . . ,MDP(ε); εg − ε− t)
+ (1− qε,2ε) δOPT (MDP(ε), . . . ,MDP(ε); εg + ε− t)]
+ (1− qt,ε) [qε,2εδOPT (MDP(ε), . . . ,MDP(ε); εg − t)
+ (1− qε,2ε) δOPT (MDP(ε), . . . ,MDP(ε); εg + 2ε− t)]
}
.
δOPT
(
~BN ; εg
)
= qε,2ε sup
t1∈[0,ε]
{
qt1,εδOPT (MDP(ε), . . . ,MDP(ε); εg − ε− t1)
+ (1− qt1,ε) δOPT (MDP(ε), . . . ,MDP(ε); εg − t1)
}
+ (1− qε,2ε) sup
t2∈[0,ε]
{
qt2,εδOPT (MDP(ε), . . . ,MDP(ε); εg + ε− t2)
+ (1− qt2,ε) δOPT (MDP(ε), . . . ,MDP(ε); εg + 2ε− t2)
}
.
Where we have applied the inductive hypothesis to ~BN after expanding the first term to ensure
that the second mechanism is ε-BR wlog. Now, applying our formula from Lemma C.2 we have:
δOPT
(
~AN ; εg
)
= sup
t∈[0,ε]
{
qt,ε
qε,2ε∑
i∈[`]
λi
[
1− eεg+(−1+2i−(N−2))ε−t
]
+
+ (1− qε,2ε)
∑
i∈[`]
λi
[
1− eεg+(1+2i−(N−2))ε−t
]
+

+ (1− qt,ε)
qε,2ε∑
i∈[`]
λi
[
1− eεg+(2i−(N−2))ε−t
]
+
+ (1− qε,2ε)
∑
i∈[`]
λi
[
1− eεg+(2+2i−(N−2))ε−t
]
+
}.
δOPT
(
~BN ; εg
)
= qε,2ε sup
t1∈[0,ε]
{
qt1,ε
∑
i∈[`]
λi
[
1− eεg+(−1+2i−(N−2))ε−t1
]
+
+ (1− qt1,ε)
∑
i∈[`]
λi
[
1− eεg+(2i−(N−2))ε−t1
]
+
}
+ (1− qε,2ε) sup
t2∈[0,ε]
{
qt2,ε
∑
i∈[`]
λi
[
1− eεg+(1+2i−(N−2))ε−t2
]
+
+ (1− qt2,ε)
∑
i∈[`]
λi
[
1− eεg+(2+2i−(N−2))ε−t2
]
+
}
.
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Comparing terms with like coefficients we see that the reduction identity applies and so each
pair of sums can be reduced. The reduction identity yields an expression that depends on t only if
t ∈ (α, α+ ε), therefore only one reduced term from each sum can depend on t as the α = εg+`ε−t
terms increase in increments of size 2ε. Furthermore, because the coefficients of ε in the first
exponent in each pair of sums (to which we are applying the reduction) have the same parity,
the same term i∗ depends on t in both. Thus, collecting the terms constant in t into constants
C1(ε), C2(ε) ∈ R, we can write:
δOPT
(
~AN ; εg
)
= sup
t∈[0,ε]
{
qε,2ε
(
C1(ε) + qt,ελi∗
[
1− eεg+(−1+2i∗−(N−2))ε−t
]
+
)
+ (1− qε,2ε)
(
C2(ε) + qt,ελi∗
[
1− eεg+(1+2i∗−(N−2))ε−t
]
+
)}
. (10)
δOPT
(
~BN ; εg
)
= qε,2ε sup
t1∈[0,ε]
{
C1(ε) + qt,ελi∗
[
1− eεg+(−1+2i∗−(N−2))ε−t1
]
+
}
+ (1− qε,2ε) sup
t2∈[0,ε]
{
C2(ε) + qt2,ελi∗
[
1− eεg+(1+2i∗−(N−2))ε−t2
]
+
}
.
(11)
Then both remaining terms in δOPT
(
~BN ; εg
)
achieve the supremum for the same argument t∗ =
t1 = t2. Fixing t = t
∗ in (10) and t1 = t2 = t∗ in (11) and comparing it is clear that δOPT
(
~AN ; εg
)
≥
δOPT
(
~BN ; εg
)
. By the triangle inequality, we also have δOPT
(
~BN ; εg
)
≥ δOPT
(
~AN ; εg
)
, which proves
the result.
C.2 Proof of Lemma 5.3
Proof. We start with the ordering with the DP mechanism at the end.
δOPT(MBR(ε),MBR(ε),MDP(ε); εg)
= sup
t1,1∈[0,ε]
{
qε,t1,1δOPT(MBR(ε),MDP(ε); εg − t1,1) + (1− qε,t1,1)δOPT(MBR(ε),MDP(ε); εg + ε− t1,1)
}
= sup
t1,1
{
qε,t1,1 sup
t1,2
{
qε,t1,2δOPT(MDP(ε); εg − t1,1 − t1,2) + (1− qε,t1,2)δOPT(MDP(ε); εg + ε− t1,1 − t1,2)
}
+(1− qε,t1,1) sup
t2,2
{
qε,t2,2δOPT(MDP(ε); εg + ε− t1,1 − t2,2) + (1− qε,t2,2)δOPT(MDP(ε); εg + 2ε− t1,1 − t2,2)
}}
= sup
t1,1,t1,2,t2,2
{
qε,t1,1qε,t1,2q2ε,ε[1− eεg−ε−t1,1−t1,2 ]+ + qε,t1,1qε,t1,2(1− q2ε,ε)[1− eεg+ε−t1,1−t1,2 ]+
+qε,t1,1(1− qε,t1,2)q2ε,ε[1− eεg−t1,1−t1,2 ]+ + (1− qε,t1,1)qε,t2,2q2ε,ε[1− eεg−t1,1−t2,2 ]+
+(1− qε,t1,1)(1− qε,t2,2)q2ε,ε[1− eεg+ε−t1,1−t2,2 ]+
}
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δOPT(MDP(ε),MBR(ε),MBR(ε); εg)
= q2ε,εδOPT(MBR(ε),MBR(ε); εg − ε) + (1− q2ε,ε)δOPT(MBR(ε),MBR(ε); εg + ε)
= q2ε,ε sup
t1,2∈[0,ε]
{
qε,t1,2δOPT(MBR(ε); εg − ε− t1,2) + (1− qε,t1,2)δOPT(MBR(ε); εg − t1,1)
}
+ (1− q2ε,ε) sup
t2,2∈[0,ε]
qε,t2,2δOPT(MBR(ε); εg + ε− t2,2) + (1− qε,t2,2) δOPT(MBR(ε); εg + 2ε− t2,2)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0

= q2ε,ε sup
t1,2
{
qε,t1,2 sup
t1,3
{
qε,t1,3 [1− eεg−ε−t1,2−t1,3 ]+ + (1− qε,t1,3)[1− eεg−t1,2−t1,3 ]+
}
+(1− qε,t1,2) sup
t2,3
{
qε,t2,3 [1− eεg−t1,2−t2,3 ]+ + (1− qε,t2,3)[1− eεg+ε−t1,2−t2,3 ]+
}}
+ (1− q2ε,ε) sup
t2,2
qε,t2,2 supt3,3
qε,t3,3 [1− eεg+ε−t2,2−t3,3 ]+ + (1− qε,t3,3) [1− eεg+2ε−t2,2−t3,3 ]+︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0


= sup
t1,2,t2,2,t1,3,t2,3,t3,3
{
qε,t1,2qε,t1,3q2ε,ε[1− eεg−ε−t1,2−t1,3 ]+ + qε,t2,2qε,t3,3(1− q2ε,ε)[1− eεg+ε−t2,2−t3,3 ]+
+qε,t1,2(1− qε,t1,3)q2ε,ε[1− eεg−t1,2−t1,3 ]+ + (1− qε,t1,2)qε,t2,3q2ε,ε[1− eεg−t1,2−t2,3 ]+
+(1− qε,t1,2)(1− qε,t2,3)q2ε,ε[1− eεg+ε−t1,2−t2,3 ]+
}
We next consider the ordering that alternates between BR and DP, as one would do with using
the exponential mechanism to discover the k most frequent elements and then adding Laplace noise
to the counts of the elements that were discovered.
δOPT(MBR(ε),MDP(ε),MBR(ε); εg)
= sup
t1,1∈[0,ε]
{
qε,t1,1δOPT(MDP(ε),MBR(ε); εg − t1,1) + (1− qε,t1,1)δOPT(MDP(ε),MBR(ε); εg + ε− t1,1)
}
= sup
t1,1∈[0,ε]
{
qε,t1,1(q2ε,εδOPT(MBR(ε); εg − t1,1 − ε) + (1− q2ε,ε)δOPT(MBR(ε); εg − t1,1 + ε))
+(1− qε,t1,1)
q2ε,εδOPT(MBR(ε); εg − t1,1) + (1− q2ε,ε) δOPT(MBR(ε); εg − t1,1 + 2ε)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0

= sup
t1,1,t1,3,t2,3,t3,3
{
qε,t1,1qε,t1,3q2ε,ε[1− eεg−t1,1−ε−t1,3 ]+ + qε,t1,1qε,t2,3(1− q2ε,ε)[1− eεg−t1,1+ε−t2,3 ]+
+qε,t1,1(1− qε,t1,3)q2ε,ε[1− eεg−t1,1−t1,3 ]+ + (1− qε,t1,1)qε,t3,3q2ε,ε[1− eεg−t1,1−t3,3 ]+
+(1− qε,t1,1)(1− qε,t3,3)q2ε,ε[1− eεg+ε−t1,1−t3,3 ]+
}
In the case when εg ≥ ε, all the terms with [1 − eεg+ε−t−t′ ]+ = 0, so all three become equal,
with a sup over three terms. Hence, in the case when εg ≥ ε we have
δOPT(MDP(ε),MBR(ε),MBR(ε); εg) = δOPT(MBR(ε),MDP(ε),MBR(ε); εg)
We then assume for the rest of the proof that εg < ε. There are many similar terms in each of the
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expressions. We start by focusing on the following term when t < εg,
sup
t′∈[0,ε]
{
qε,t′ [1− eεg−ε−t−t′ ]+ + (1− qε,t′)[1− eεg−t−t′ ]+
}
= max
{
q2
ε,
εg−t
2
(
1− e−ε) , 1− eεg−ε−t} .
To determine which term attains the maximum, we consider each term,
q2
ε,
εg−t
2
(
1− e−ε) =
(
1− e
εg−t
2 −ε
)2
1− e−ε =
1− 2e
εg−t
2 −ε + eεg−t−2ε
1− e−ε
1− eεg−ε−t = 1− e
−ε − eεg−t−ε + eεg−t−2ε
1− e−ε
Hence, for t < εg, we have
max
{
q2
ε,
εg−t
2
(
1− e−ε) , 1− eεg−ε−t} = q2
ε,
εg−t
2
(
1− e−ε)
⇐⇒ 0 ≤ eεg−t − 2e
εg−t
2 + 1 =
(
1− e
εg−t
2
)2
.
In the case where t ∈ [εg, ε], we have
sup
t′∈[0,ε]
{
qε,t′ [1− eεg−ε−t−t′ ]+ + (1− qε,t′)[1− eεg−t−t′ ]+
}
= 1− eεg−ε−t.
We next focus on another common term in each expression, considering first when t < εg.
sup
t′∈[0,ε]
{
qε,t′ [1− eεg−t−t′ ]+ + (1− qε,t′)[1− eεg+ε−t−t′ ]+
}
= q2
ε,
εg+ε−t
2
(
1− e−ε)
On the other hand, if t ∈ [εg, ε], we have
sup
t′∈[0,ε]
{
qε,t′ [1− eεg−t−t′ ]+ + (1− qε,t′)[1− eεg+ε−t−t′ ]+
}
= max
{
q2
ε,
εg+ε−t
2
(
1− e−ε) , 1− eεg−t}
Once again, to determine which term attains the maximum, we consider each term,
q2
ε,
εg+ε−t
2
(
1− e−ε) =
(
1− e
εg−ε−t
2
)2
1− e−ε =
1− 2e
εg−ε−t
2 + eεg−ε−t
1− e−ε
1− eεg−t = 1− e
−ε − eεg−t + eεg−ε−t
1− e−ε
39
Hence, for t ∈ [εg, ε], we have
max
{
q2
ε,
εg+ε−t
2
(
1− e−ε) , 1− eεg−t} = q2
ε,
εg+ε−t
2
(
1− e−ε)
⇐⇒ 0 ≤ eεg−ε−t − 2e
εg−ε−t
2 + 1 =
(
1− e
εg−ε−t
2
)2
Putting this together, we have
δOPT(MDP(ε),MBR(ε),MBR(ε); εg)
= q2ε,ε max
{
sup
t1,2∈[0,εg)
{
qε,t1,2q
2
ε,
εg−t1,2
2
(
1− e−ε)+ (1− qε,t1,2)q2
ε,
εg+ε−t1,2
2
(
1− e−ε)} ,
sup
t1,2∈[εg ,ε]
{
qε,t1,2(1− eεg−ε−t1,2) + (1− qε,t1,2)q2
ε,
εg+ε−t1,2
2
(
1− e−ε)}}
+ (1− q2ε,ε) sup
t2,2∈[εg ,ε]
{
qε,t2,2q
2
ε,ε+
εg−t2,2
2
(
1− e−ε)}
= max
{
sup
t1,2∈[0,εg)
x(t1.2), sup
t1,2∈[εg ,ε]
y(t1,2)
}
+ sup
t2,2∈[εg ,ε]
z(t2,2)
We now focus on δOPT(MBR(ε),MDP(ε),MBR(ε); εg),
δOPT(MBR(ε),MDP(ε),MBR(ε); εg)
= max
{
q2ε,ε sup
t1,1∈[0,εg)
{
qε,t1,1q
2
ε,
εg−t1,1
2
(
1− e−ε)+ (1− qε,t1,1)q2
ε,
εg+ε−t1,1
2
(
1− e−ε)} ,
q2ε,ε sup
t1,1∈[εg ,ε]
{
qε,t1,1(1− eεg−ε−t1,1) + (1− qε,t1,1)q2
ε,
εg+ε−t1,1
2
(
1− e−ε)
+(1− q2ε,ε)qε,t1,1q2
ε,ε+
εg−t1,1
2
(
1− e−ε)}}
= max
{
sup
t1,1∈[0,εg)
x(t1,1), sup
t1,1∈[εg ,ε]
y(t1,1) + z(t1,1)
}
Lastly, we focus on δOPT(MBR(ε),MBR(ε),MDP(ε); εg). Note that when t1,1 < εg, we always have
εg + ε − t1,1 − t1,2 ≥ 0 for all t1,2 ∈ [0, ε], and for t1,1 ∈ [εg, ε] we have εg − t1,1 − t1,2 < 0 for any
t1,2 > 0.
δOPT(MBR(ε),MDP(ε),MBR(ε); εg)
= sup
t1,1,t1,2
{
qε,t1,1qε,t1,2q2ε,ε[1− eεg−ε−t1,1−t1,2 ]+ + qε,t1,1qε,t1,2(1− q2ε,ε)[1− eεg+ε−t1,1−t1,2 ]+
+qε,t1,1(1− qε,t1,2)q2ε,ε[1− eεg−t1,1−t1,2 ]+ + (1− qε,t1,1)q2ε,εq2
ε,
εg+ε−t1,1
2
(1− e−ε)
}
= max
{
sup
t1,1∈[0,εg)
x(t1,1), sup
t1,1∈[εg ,ε]
y(t1,1) + z(t1,1)
}
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Summarizing this, we then have for the nonnegative functions x(t), y(t), and z(t) defined above,
δOPT(MDP(ε),MBR(ε),MBR(ε); εg) = max
{
sup
t∈[0,εg)
x(t), sup
t∈[εg ,ε]
y(t)
}
+ sup
t′∈[εg ,ε]
z(t′)
δOPT(MBR(ε),MDP(ε),MBR(ε); εg) = max
{
sup
t∈[0,εg)
x(t), sup
t∈[εg ,ε]
y(t) + z(t)
}
= δOPT(MBR(ε),MBR(ε),MDP(ε); εg)
C.3 Proof of Lemma 5.4
Proof. We start by computing the derivatives of the necessary functions,
x′(t) = 1−e
ε/2
(1−e−ε)2
(
et − eε/2
)
e
εg−t
2 −2ε.
y′(t) = e−2ε−t
(
et/2 − e
εg+ε
2
)(
e3t/2 − e
εg+ε
2
)
z′(t) = −e−ε−t(et/2 − eεg/2)
(
e3t/2 − eε+εg/2
)
(y + z)′(t) = (eε/2 − 1)2(eε/2 + 1)(eε/2 − et)e
εg−6ε−t
2 .
Note that for any t ∈ [0, ε], we have
q2
ε,
εg−t
2
(
1− e−ε) > (1− eεg−ε−t)
⇐⇒ 0 <
(
1− e
εg−t
2
)2
Hence, as long as t 6= εg, we have x(t) > y(t). We break up the analysis into two cases, depending
on whether εg is larger or smaller than ε/2.
Case 1: First assume that ε/2 < εg. In this case, we have,
sup
t∈[εg ,ε]
y(t) < x(ε/2) = sup
t∈[0,εg)
x(t).
Furthermore, we have for any t ∈ [εg, ε]
y(t) + z(t) < x(ε/2) + z(t) < x(ε/2) + z(t) ≤ x(ε/2) + sup
t′∈[εg ,ε]
z(t′)
Case 2: When ε/2 = εg, we have for any t ∈ (εg, ε]
y(t) + z(t) < x(t) + z(t) < x(εg) + z(t) ≤ sup
t′∈[0,εg)
x(t′) + sup
t′∈[εg ,ε]
z(t′)
and y(εg) + z(εg)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
= x(εg) < x(εg) + sup
t′∈[εg ,ε]
z(t′) = sup
t′∈[0,εg)
x(t′) + sup
t′∈[εg ,ε]
z(t′)
Note that we are taking sup over compact sets, including the element εg. Thus, we have, in the
case of ε/2 ≤ εg that δOPT(MBR(ε),MDP(ε),MBR(ε); εg) < δOPT(MDP(ε),MBR(ε),MBR(ε); εg).
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Case 3: Now we consider ε/2 > εg. In this case,
sup
t∈[0,εg)
x(t) = x(εg) = y(εg) < y
(
εg+ε
3
)
= sup
t′∈[εg ,ε]
y(t′).
Looking at the derivatives of z(t) and y(t), computed above, the term that maximizes y(t) is not
the same as z(t), so that
sup
t∈[εg ,ε]
y(t) + z(t) < sup
t∈[εg ,ε]
y(t) + sup
t′∈[εg ,ε]
z(t′)
This concludes the proof.
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